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Abstract 
The paper considers theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of standards-based 
school reform.  Our theoretical synthesis distinguishes between sorting and incentive 
effects of high standards, and spells out the potential tradeoffs and complementarities 
between enhancing efficiency and equity in student achievement.  Differentiated 
credentials can be helpful in ameliorating tradeoffs, provided that distinct signals are 
clearly understood, especially between cognitive and non-cognitive skills.  The paper 
reviews trends in state-level school accountability systems, and examines empirical 
evidence on the impact of increased standards and expectations on student achievement.  
Finally, the paper reviews some of the practical challenges facing the standards 
movement. 
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INCENTIVES AND EQUITY UNDER STANDARDS-BASED REFORM 
Julian R. Betts and Robert M. Costrell 
 
Introduction 
 Standards-based reform is a strategy that includes specifying what is to be learned, 
devising tests to measure learning, and establishing consequences of performance for 
students and schools (e.g. setting cut scores for grade promotion and high school 
graduation).  The goal of this strategy is to raise student performance across the spectrum, 
especially for students from those schools, often heavily minority, where expectations are 
chronically low.  The point is to alter incentives and change the behavior of students, 
teachers, administrators, and parents in a way that improves learning. 
 Popular support remains strong for this strategy, according to national polling 
data,1 as well as local data in the states implementing this strategy.  For example, a recent 
poll in Massachusetts, which is implementing one of the more rigorous sets of exams 
(effective for the class of 2003), indicates that 70% of the general population favors 
graduation exams.  Support is slightly more emphatic from urban than suburban 
respondents, and somewhat broader (75%) from those with income under $25,000.  When 
respondents are asked if they would still support the exams should 25% of students in 
their communities fail on the first try, support remains unchanged overall at 70%, and 
actually rises to 81% among those with income under $25,000.2 
 Nonetheless, vocal, if not yet necessarily wide, opposition has emerged in several 
states, in the runup to full implementation of standards-based reforms.  Objections fall 
into different categories.  One source of discord concerns the content of what should be 
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learned.  The battles of the mid-90s over national content standards in history and 
English, and more recently in science and math, have had their counterparts in the states.3  
Despite continuing conflicts, it does seem that certain broad (if not universal) agreement 
can be obtained in basic content areas (at least math and English).  In this paper, we shall 
not focus on content disagreements, but rather on disputes over testing and cutoffs.  
However, it is worth bearing in mind that at least some of the more vocal opposition to 
testing is itself based (if not always explicitly so) on unresolved disagreements over 
content standards, since it is the tests that give force to the content standards. 
 Opposition to testing-with-consequences is based on a simple, fundamental fact of 
life:  almost any change creates winners and losers.  To take a key example, technological 
progress has always had its losers, from the hand-loom weavers to the buggy-makers to 
current-day bricks-and-mortar retailers, computer illiterates, and those of low cognitive 
skills more generally.  Indeed, it is the technologically caused losses of those with low 
cognitive skills over the last two decades that drives much of the standards-based reform 
movement. So, too, may standards-based reform create its own losers (at least in the short 
run) in the attempt to create more winners from technological progress.  The fact that 
there are losers, along with winners, is not, in itself, a compelling reason to roll back the 
standards any more than it would be a reason to try to halt technical progress (by, say, 
shutting down the U.S. Patent Office).  Rather, it forces us to examine the nature of the 
losses and craft an appropriate set of policies to minimize them. 
 The most obvious potential losers are those who may not meet the standard, and 
who may not earn a high school diploma as a result.   But this is only the beginning of the 
analysis.  For example, as we shall explain, it makes a great deal of difference whether 
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the failure rate rises as a result of sorting or whether it also reflects adverse incentive 
effects.  The distinction is important both for evaluating the costs of increased standards 
and also for focusing policies to mitigate costs.  Similarly, it is important to distinguish 
sorting and incentive effects among the winners from various points on the educational 
spectrum. 
 Clearly, standards generate a mix of sorting and incentive effects, and we need to 
understand them both.  How are incentives altered by standards-based reform, for better 
or for worse, to encourage or discourage achievement?  What are the tradeoffs between 
some students’ losses and others’ gains, in learning and/or income?  Do these tradeoffs 
adversely affect equity, as opponents to standards-based reform often claim?  Or is equity  
enhanced by raising standards in schools attended by disadvantaged students?  How can 
we explain the fact that some of the most vocal opposition often comes from the most 
advantaged districts?   Finally, and most importantly, what steps can and should be taken 
to minimize the losses and spread the gains most broadly from standards-based reform? 
 Our analysis below begins by reviewing the economic theory of educational 
standards in order to sort out the several effects of standards on incentives and equity.  
Although this literature cannot quantify these effects, it can help us understand the forces 
at play, as well as the dilemmas we face.   A key issue that comes out of this analysis is 
the structure of information.  It matters a great deal whether we have a coarse pass/fail 
signal or more finely grained information, such as multiple credentials. 
 We then review the current  array of state educational standards, and provide some 
evidence regarding the factors that help explain the variation across states.  Next, we turn 
to the rather limited statistical evidence that currently exists regarding the effects of 
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standards, and also provide some new evidence.  Ideally, we would like to know how 
strong a response high-stakes testing will elicit from schools, parents, and students in 
order to bring the failure rate down.  We report briefly on the standards controversies in 
Massachusetts and California.  We summarize four key obstacles confronting the 
movement to raise educational standards, and suggest partial solutions.  We conclude by 
drawing a few lessons for policy-makers that seem justified by the theory and evidence at 
hand, which might ameliorate some of the potentially harsh tradeoffs.  
 
The Economic Theory of Educational Standards 
 The economic theory of educational standards attempts to elucidate the likely 
effects on learning incentives and economic outcomes by means of a simplified model.  
The reason we apply economic theory to the subject of standards is precisely because 
economics offers a well-developed framework for the study of incentives, which lie at the 
heart of standards-based reform.  It also offers a systematic method for identifying likely 
winners and losers, and, more important, the reasons behind and nature of the gains and 
losses.  Finally, economic theory helps point to policy measures that might ameliorate 
tradeoffs (a familiar phenomenon in economics).  To be sure, there are also limitations to 
the economic analysis of standards, as we discuss below. 
 The analysis largely focuses on the passing score required for an educational 
credential, for a given test, covering a given set of content standards. Consider the effect 
of a rise in the cutoff, in a simple pass/fail world, with a single undifferentiated diploma. 
All the theoretical models that we are familiar with predict a rise in the failure rate, along 
with other, more salutary, effects.  This literature, of course, is silent on the magnitude of 
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the rise in the failure rate (which is critical in comparing with the beneficial effects), but it 
does help us distinguish between more and less compelling reasons for concern.  
Specifically, a pair of papers by us brings out the critical distinction between the sorting 
and incentive effects of standards.4    
 
Sorting Effects of Graduation Cutoffs 
 Consider first a simple sorting model, where behavior and thus learning are held 
constant, independent of the standard.  Then a rise in the cutoff merely re-labels some 
students as failers who would otherwise be considered passers.  There is, by assumption, 
no effect on learning or productivity, so aggregate income generated by the students is 
unchanged, but the distribution of it does change.   The students who pass are now a more 
elite group, so their average productivity is higher.  To the extent that graduates are 
pooled together in the eyes of employers (who may make only limited use of  individual 
information, as John Bishop has long argued), their wages tend to rise.  This point is well 
understood:  higher standards raise the value of a high school diploma.   
 Less widely understood, however, is a point stressed by Betts, namely that higher 
standards also raise the average quality of the pool of non-graduates, insofar as some 
students who would previously have passed now fail.  Since non-graduates (like 
graduates) are evaluated by employers in part on the average quality of their pool, their 
wages also tend to rise.  This is not a minor point.  The reason non-graduates typically 
fare so poorly under the existing system is that the ease of social promotion exacerbates 
the stigma attached to non-graduation.5  Thus, it is a logical fallacy to argue, as many do, 
that higher standards will reduce more students to the current economic level of non-
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graduates; the stigma on non-graduates depends on their average quality, and that depends 
critically on the standard itself.  
 To summarize this very simple model, a rise in standards leads to gains for two of 
the three groups -- those at the top, who graduate, and those at the bottom, who would not 
have graduated anyway.  The losers are those in the middle, who would have graduated 
under a less stringent standard, but who now fail.  Such an individual now suffers from 
being pooled with a group that includes those less skilled than himself (those without the 
diploma) rather than with those more skilled than himself. There has been no efficiency 
loss in this pure sorting model, only a distributional effect due to the individual’s re-
labelling.  Do these losses constitute a compelling case against higher standards?  We 
believe not, for two reasons.   
 First, in terms of the narrow choice between high and low cutoffs, it is not 
immediately clear that a high cutoff leads to less egalitarian outcomes.  The redistribution 
is from the losers in the middle to the winners at both the top and the bottom.  Those with 
the most egalitarian preferences (so-called “Rawlsians,” after the philosopher John 
Rawls) place the highest priority on raising incomes at the bottom, so they should favor a 
rise in standards.6  Again, the point is not academic:  the equity implications of higher 
standards are not limited to those who are at increased risk of failing, but include also 
those who would fail in any case, and whose stigma stands to be reduced. 
 The second, and more fundamental reason that we do not find the losses from 
adverse pooling to constitute a compelling case against higher standards is that it is not 
the standards themselves that are at the heart of this issue.  Rather, the crux of the matter 
is the imperfect information that underlies such pooling.  How concerned should we be if 
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someone loses from no longer being confused with those of greater skill?  We should 
indeed be concerned about those able students who are now pooled with those of lesser 
talent, but the answer is not necessarily to reverse the rise in standards and re-classify 
them with those of greater talent.  Perhaps, instead, the analysis suggests that information 
flows should be improved, if possible, such that individual talents are more accurately 
conveyed than with a simple binary pass/fail credential, as Bishop has long argued.  We 
return to this question -- full information vs. binary credentials -- at greater length below, 
since it arises not only in the context of sorting, but also of incentives. 
 
Incentive Effects of Graduation Cutoffs 
 The losses incurred from  sorting may not be of first-order policy importance, but 
neither are the gains from sorting the reason for implementing standards.  The rationale 
for standards is to alter incentives of students, parents, teachers, and administrators to 
change behavior in a way that advances learning.  Microeconomic analysis, the study of 
how rational actors respond to incentives, may offer some insights.   
 Economic theory predicts that the effect of raising the graduation cutoff depends 
on where students lie in the distribution of ability and/or attitudes toward study.7   
Suppose the cutoff is raised from a level at which 10% fail to one at which 20% would 
fail under existing behavior.   Under a pure sorting model, where behavior is held 
constant, this rise in standards would of course lead to a doubling of the failure rate.  
Under a more realistic model, students (and their parents) respond to higher standards by 
re-evaluating the costs and benefits of student effort.8 
 How are the incentives for student effort affected at different parts of the 
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distribution?  Consider first those students at or near the 20th percentile under the original 
distribution of achievement.  In this example, these are students who passed under the old 
standard by a margin of 10 percentiles, but who are now just on the margin of passing 
under the new standard. It would take only a small increase in  their effort for a number of 
them to pass.  The cost in doing so would be less than the substantial benefit of passing 
rather than failing, and so the higher standard will have a positive incentive effect on 
utility-maximizing individuals in this part of the distribution.  As a result, one can predict 
with some confidence that the failure rate will not rise as much as would be naively 
predicted under the pre-existing distribution of student achievement,9 because students in 
this part of the distribution will rise to the challenge. 
 It is important to emphasize that these students, the ones for whom the most 
positive response is predicted and who have the most to gain from higher standards, are 
not the elite (they are near the 20th percentile in this example).  Unlike the elite, who will 
easily pass the higher standard with unchanged effort, these are students who are 
stimulated to higher effort because otherwise they will fail.   These students are typically 
non-college-bound or marginally college-bound.  For those non-college-bound students 
who rise to the challenge, the benefit is a high school diploma of enhanced value -- a 
matter of great importance for those who will not have a college degree with which to 
distinguish themselves.  For the marginally college-bound, the benefit of being prodded to 
meet a higher standard is better preparation for college, which, in turn, raises the 
probability of successful college completion.10 
 However, the incentives are different farther down the distribution.  Specifically, 
consider those students who are on the margin of failing under the old standard (students 
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at or slightly above the 10th percentile in this example).  The effort they are exerting 
yields expected benefits that barely exceed the costs of the effort.  A rise in the standard 
reduces the probability of passing with that level of effort, and thereby reduces the 
expected benefit below the cost.  For these students, the rise in standards has a negative 
incentive effect, leading them to reduce their effort, discouraged by the low prospects of 
success.   Indeed, they may simply drop out of school, as critics of standards-based reform 
warn.  This effect is more troubling than the sorting effect discussed above, because it 
reduces the amount of learning in this portion of the distribution.  11 
 Thus, standards have different effects on students in different parts of the 
distribution, even among those of lesser achievement.12  As Figure 1 illustrates, we can 
distinguish four groups of students who are at risk of failing under the higher standard:13 
• Some students who met previously low expectations will be stimulated to greater 
effort by a rise in standards, with the help of teachers and parents.  (In Figure 1, the 
dashed distribution of productivity depicts a rightward shift from just left of the new 
standard.) These are the most important gains from high standards. 
• Other students who would have passed under low standards will not change their 
behavior and will now fail.  (In Figure 1, these are the students remaining between the 
old and new standards, on the dashed distribution.)  These students lose, but only by 
virtue of being re-labelled.   
• Other students, farther down the distribution, will be discouraged and reduce effort or 
drop out.  (In Figure 1, the dashed distribution of productivity depicts a leftward shift 
from just right of the old standard.)  These are the most important potential losses 
from high standards, toward which mitigating policies should be aimed. 
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• For those students at the very bottom (the left-most portion of Figure 1), who would 
not pass anyway, behavior is unaffected, but they may passively gain from the sorting 
effect discussed previously.   
 Policy-makers and others may differ on how to weigh the fortunes of these groups 
in arriving at the optimal set of standards.  The way out of this dilemma is not necessarily 
to forgo the benefits of higher standards, but, if at all possible, to craft accompanying 
policies for those students whose efforts may flag, especially those who might drop out.  
What those policies might be is considered below, but the point here is to be clear on 
what segment of the population is at issue, both for potential losses and gains. 
 Curiously, though, much of the most vocal opposition to standards-based reform 
comes from a completely different segment of the population -- that of generally high 
achievers.  For example, according to recent reports, “Wisconsin scuttled plans for a high 
school exit exam after a protest lodged mainly by more-affluent parents.”14  Similarly, 
efforts in Massachusetts to boycott the state-wide exams have been concentrated in 
affluent and high-achieving suburbs, as well as high-spending communities such as 
Cambridge, rather than such urban  areas as Boston.  State Representative Ruth Balser 
told a group of Brookline test critics that most of her legislative colleagues support the 
exams. “It’s just those of us from districts that were already doing really well, like 
Lincoln-Sudbury, Brookline, and Newton, who feel that our systems are at risk of being 
dragged down by ed reform,” she said.15 
 Perhaps the most plausible claim that suburban critics have to offer is that higher-
order skills may be de-emphasized by teachers of high-achieving students, students who 
are at relatively low risk of failing.  It is not entirely clear why this would be so at the 
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high school level, if students are sorted among basic and honors classes.16  The more elite 
students, aiming for selective college admissions, are more likely focused on SATs, AP 
exams, and a high school transcript enhanced with high grades in honors courses than on 
high school exit exams.   However, if the school reallocates resources, or changes its 
teaching methods to bring up those at risk of failing, these equity-enhancing efforts could 
adversely affect those of high achievement.17  If so, it is important to understand that 
these objections to standards-based reform are not based on equity concerns, but quite the 
opposite.18 
 Again, the policy implication is not necessarily to forgo the benefits of higher 
standards, just because they may be concentrated among those for whom expectations are 
low, relative to the high-achieving critics.  Rather, the challenge is to meet these 
objections by accompanying the standards with policies addressed toward the high 
achievers as well.  In our view, discussed below, this is a rather easier and less pressing 
challenge than the one concerning lower achievers, who might be discouraged from 
continuing academic effort. 
 
Centralized vs. Decentralized Standards 
 What is the proper locus of standard-setting -- Federal, state, or local?  Over the 
last two decades, the movement toward standard-setting began with the states in the late 
1970s (“minimum competency” testing), shifted toward the Federal level from the late 
1980s to the early 1990s, and has shifted back to the states since the mid 1990s, where it 
has made its greatest strides.19 Leaving aside the question of where content standards 
should be set, economic theory does have something to say about whether graduation 
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cutoffs should be set locally or centrally.  
In the very simplest case, where all districts are alike, decentralization would 
likely lead to inefficiently low standards.20   To see this, suppose each district’s non-
college-bound graduates are pooled to some extent with graduates of other districts in the 
labor market.  That is, employers do not fully distinguish graduates of any district that 
chooses  a different standard.21   The reward to raising standards in any given district is 
thus attenuated.  The district’s graduates would be of higher quality, but would not be 
fully identified as such, and so would only reap some of the benefits;  the rest of the gains 
would spill over to graduates of other districts, with whom they are pooled in the labor 
market.   As a result of this “externality”, local standard-setters have an incentive to free-
ride on the standards of other districts, establishing cutoffs that are too low to maximize 
their collective welfare.22  A centralized standard-setter would avoid this problem. 
  Even in this simple case, with identical districts, there are winners and losers in 
the choice between decentralized and centralized standards.  Since centralization raises 
standards, the winners are those who rise to the challenge, and the losers are those who 
become discouraged from exerting effort.  But each district would, on the whole, be 
better off with a centralized standard-setter choosing the same cutoff for all districts.23   
This logic is independent of the weights attached to winners and losers;  even the most 
egalitarian collection of standard-setters would prefer standards set centrally, rather than 
each of them riding free in a standard-cutting race to the bottom.24 
 Heterogeneity across districts makes things more complicated, but is also an 
important factor in understanding current controversies.25 For example, centralization 
typically raises standards in low-achieving districts, but may lower it in high-achieving 
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ones.  To the extent that diplomas reflect some degree of district reputation (i.e. pooling is 
not total), this means low-achieving districts’ graduates benefit from the rise in their 
standard while those from high-achieving districts lose from the drop in theirs.26  Thus, 
there may be a conflict of interest between those high-striving urban black students whose 
diploma is enhanced in value and those suburban students whose diploma could be  
depreciated from that which obtained under decentralized standards.  
With heterogeneity across districts, centralization need not always outperform 
decentralization.27  However, if we take the analysis one step further, a rather general 
result obtains.  Suppose the centralized standard serves as a minimum requirement for 
graduation, with the localities retaining the option of setting a higher standard.  This 
arrangement outperforms decentralized standard-setting and is at least as good as central 
standard-setting without the local option.  We get the best of both worlds, with the 
centralized minimum standard putting a floor on free-riding by districts, while the high-
achieving districts retain the option of exceeding that standard, if enough of the benefits 
accrue to their own graduates.28 
The model considered here helps frame questions that arise from current 
controversies.  For example, in Massachusetts (among other states), the demand for local 
control of graduation requirements is strongest in the suburbs, while urban 
superintendents are generally the biggest supporters of rigorous state standards (even 
though their students are most at risk of failing).  The urban districts suffer from a poor 
reputation, but have still found it difficult to unilaterally raise it.  One possible 
explanation that goes beyond the simple model but is consistent with its spirit is that a 
district’s reputation adjusts only slowly to its own actions.  A long period of low 
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standards will result in a low reputation, but a unilateral rise in standards may only raise 
the reputation over time, increasing dropouts in the short run with no reward.  On this 
view, the imprimatur of state standards promises to be a more informationally powerful 
signal, more readily recognized, than the urban districts could establish on their own.  We 
suspect that political considerations beyond the model are also important.  The state 
mandate provides valuable cover to superintendents who would like to raise standards but 
who face local political and union obstacles to doing so and to taking steps necessary to 
meet them. 
The model we have considered assumes there is some pooling, or blurring of 
credentials across districts even in the long run.  If there is no such blurring of credentials 
-- if each district’s diploma is fully understood by employers to represent that district’s 
own graduation cutoff -- then the model’s case for decentralized standard-setting is 
stronger.  But even then, as we have discussed, high-striving students in low-achieving 
districts suffer from having their accomplishments depreciated by the low standards that 
local authorities tend to set in those districts.  If policy-makers are able to reduce the 
degree of cross-district pooling to reduce the need for centralization, then why not reduce 
intra-district pooling as well, so that high-achievers in any district can be evaluated by 
their individual accomplishments?  It is to this question that we now turn. 
 
Binary Credentials vs. Fuller Information 
 John Bishop has long argued that credentials such as a high school diploma, 
which convey only a binary signal to employers, are far inferior to richer and more finely 
graded information flows, such as those conveyed in high school transcripts.  Economic 
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theory has quite a bit to say about the incentive and equity implications of improved 
information flows, and largely bears out Bishop’s argument.  A difficult question, 
however, is why employers often choose not to use the fuller information flows that are 
available.  This question, to which we have no totally satisfactory answer, is important in 
designing policies to ameliorate the tradeoffs carried by a system of binary credentials. 
 In understanding the effects of improving information flows over that of binary 
credentials, it is again important to distinguish sorting effects from incentive effects.  
Consider the simplest case, where a single measure of productivity (such as a test score) 
is available, but a credential truncates that measure into a pass-fail signal.  In a simple 
sorting model, where behavior is assumed constant, the truncation of full information 
redistributes income by pooling.  Among those who fall below the cutoff, the average 
income is unchanged, but it is redistributed from those just below the cutoff toward those 
at the very bottom, with whom they are pooled.  Similarly, among those above the cutoff, 
the truncation of full information redistributes from those at the very top downward to 
those just above the cutoff.  Thus, in the simplest sorting model, binary credentials 
generate outcomes that are more egalitarian than full information.  However, even within 
the confines of these assumptions, we do not find the case for redistribution by blurring of 
differences to be compelling, unlike a case based on improved incentives. 
 Even before considering incentive effects, however, there is another aspect of 
sorting that bears examination, and that is the issue of job-matching.  Better sorting 
improves the match between workers and jobs.  Truncating information with a binary 
credential reduces the efficiency of the match and reduces output.  Who bears the brunt of 
the lost efficiency: those at the top or those at the bottom?  In one recent model the 
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answer depends on where in the job ladder accurate sorting is most important.29  Suppose 
it is most important at the top, i.e. it is more important to get the very best people into the 
very top jobs than getting the least productive people into the very bottom jobs.  Then the 
burden of the efficiency loss from truncating information will tend to fall on the least-
skilled, and this can outweigh any beneficial pooling effect they may enjoy.  The reason is 
that the wage earned by the least-skilled depends very much on the ability of those higher 
up the job ladder who can only do those top jobs with the support of those lower down.  If 
those who will fill the top jobs are not as well identified, due to truncated information, 
then the reward to the least-skilled for supporting those in the top jobs will fall.  In this 
case, the use of full information enhances both efficiency and equity. 
 Now consider the incentive effects of full information.30  If employers have and 
use individual information, diplomas and standards become irrelevant, since they add 
nothing to it.  Each student chooses his or her own preferred level of achievement and is 
rewarded accordingly.  More realistically, information flows can be improved by 
generating a discrete number of differentiated credentials.  Either way, fuller information 
affects incentives in different ways across the spectrum of students. 
 Compared to a coarse pass-fail signal, better information about high achievement 
is surely a stimulus to those at the top of the distribution, who would otherwise find no 
payoff in exceeding the cutoff.  This, it seems to us, provides much of the answer to the 
criticism that high-achieving districts are “dragged down” by standards-based reform.  
Clearly, high-achieving students are already motivated to excel by an array of credentials 
over and above high school graduation exams (e.g. SAT’s and AP exams).  If these are 
insufficient, it is a relatively simple matter to differentiate diplomas based on the level of 
 Betts and Costrell  17 
performance on the graduation exams, as a number of states do. 
 Moreover, differentiated consequences for differentiated credentials seem 
particularly straightforward to arrange for college-bound students.  Admission to public 
higher education can be made contingent on higher performance levels than are required 
for graduation;  scholarships can be based on higher levels yet.  These credentials may be 
multi-dimensional, for those who find traditional graduation requirements overly narrow.  
For example, there are many credentials based on artistic and musical talent that students 
place on their college applications.  There are literary contests, outlets such as the 
Concord Review (for historical essays), and science fairs , to name just a few more 
credentials that high-achieving students can aim for, with confidence that they will be 
recognized. 
 It might be argued that schools will be under pressure to divert attention from 
these types of credentials toward the graduation exam, even for those students who are at 
no risk of failing.  There could be some truth to this, insofar as districts reap rewards 
based on mean exam scores, rather than pass rates only (e.g. the real estate market may 
tend to do this).  However, this effect should not be exaggerated, since districts will 
surely continue to be attuned to how well their students do in college admissions, which 
still rests on these other types of credentials.  That is why some high-achieving districts 
choose not to “teach to” the graduation exams any more than is necessary to achieve 
passing performance.  In short, the introduction of graduation exams only adds 
information to the existing array of high-end credentials, and should not pose any serious 
incentive problems for high-achieving students. 
 At the bottom of the distribution, the incentive effect from fuller information 
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should also be positive.  Those students who have no other way to convey their skills 
short of a graduation standard that is beyond their will or ability to meet would certainly 
gain from finer signals.  As John D. Owen points out,31 fuller information at this end of 
the distribution advances egalitarian goals by giving students less extreme alternatives to 
dropping out.   
 This is the rationale behind the proposal that students who repeatedly fail the state 
graduation exam might receive instead a local diploma or a local certificate of 
completion.  Such a credential could convey the achievement of non-cognitive skills such 
as persistence, punctuality, and discipline that are also important and rewarded in the 
labor market.32  The GED already exists as an alternative credential, and should continue 
to signal a certain level of cognitive skills.  But its payoff in the market is considerably 
less than a high school diploma, probably because it does not convey the same level of 
non-cognitive skills as even a diploma based on “seat time” alone.33  So there remains 
room for a credential to certify such non-cognitive skills (which may be particularly 
important for some special education children).   
 The challenge is to make sure that such a non-cognitive credential is properly 
differentiated from a standards-based credential that signifies both cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, and that it is treated as such by end-users (employers or colleges).  This is 
at the heart of the dispute between those who would grant a local “diploma” option and 
those who would only allow a local “certificate of completion.”  For reasons perhaps 
better understood by psychologists than economists, such terminological distinctions 
seem to be empirically quite important. 
The concern is that a local diploma would not be treated with sufficient 
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differentiation from a state diploma, and would thereby undermine incentives for those 
students who would otherwise meet the state standard.  (This seems to have been the 
rationale for New York’s decision to phase out the local diploma option, leaving only the 
Regents diploma.)  A certificate of completion could and perhaps should convey the same 
information that a high school diploma currently conveys in those states where the 
requirements are almost entirely local (such as Massachusetts, until the state standards 
bind in 2003).  Once employers recognize that a certificate of completion is equivalent to 
the old local diploma, there should be no basis for objecting that students are denied a 
“diploma” by the higher state standard.  “Diploma” is only a word.  If it takes a different 
word -- “certificate” vs. “diploma” -- to differentiate those who have met the old local 
standards from those who meet the new state standards, then this would provide the finer 
information flows that are called for.  Of course, there will remain those who object to 
such differentiation -- as to all differentiation -- on the grounds (perhaps unstated) that it 
will deny “certificate” holders the benefits of being pooled with those who hold 
“diplomas.”  But we do not find such sorting arguments persuasive. 
 Finally, we turn from those near the top and those near the bottom to our final 
group of students, those who would meet the state standard, but not by much.  These are 
students for whom the incentive effects of full information are negative.  They are 
students who rise to the challenge of the standard only because the alternatives are so 
much worse.  If information flows are improved, these are students who would choose to 
meet a lesser level of achievement that has a lesser payoff, but not as dramatically so as 
dropping out.   The problem here is that too many students evaluate the payoffs to higher 
achievement differently from adults, such as their parents or state standard-setters or from 
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the adults that they will become themselves.  That is because the labor market signals to 
students are somewhat remote, and also because many students are notoriously present-
oriented.34  It is also likely that schools have a greater incentive to bring students up to a 
given standard when the alternative is dramatically worse than simply meeting a lesser 
standard.  In short, while the coarse instrument of pass-fail blunts incentives for those at 
the bottom and the top, it does elicit greater effort from those near the passing margin. 
 This brings us to one of the key policy dilemmas that comes out of our theoretical 
analysis:  how much differentiation should there be between the state-certified standards-
based diploma and any lesser credentials?  If the differentiation is too large, then students 
near the bottom will have no incentive to achieve beyond the low level certified by the 
lesser credentials.  If, alternatively, the gap between the lesser credentials and the state 
diploma is too small (as with continuous measures, such as the test score itself, affixed to 
the diploma or the transcript), then too many students who might meet the state standard 
would be willing to settle for less, especially if employers ignore the differentiation.   
 We have reached the limits of our theoretical analysis.  We believe it shows that 
some problems alleged by critics of standards-based reform are not particularly 
compelling, notably those based implicitly on the logic of pooling and those concerning 
incentives for high-achieving students.  But it also points to a tradeoff between incentives 
for those lesser-achieving students who will be stimulated to meet high standards and 
those low-achieving students who will be discouraged.  The analysis clearly indicates that 
the key to ameliorating this tradeoff is not so much one of setting the standard high or low 
as it is one of filling in the information spectrum with credentials that allow lesser 
achieving students to demonstrate their cognitive and non-cognitive skills.  The optimal 
 Betts and Costrell  21 
degree of differentiation among these credentials can probably only be worked out in 
practice over time, by trial and error, since it depends very much on the way employers 
will treat different credentials, which is not something that is easily foretold.  
 
A Description of Current State Educational Standards 
 We now turn our attention to how in the United States educational standards have 
been defined in practice, with a focus on the variations among states.  Effective 
educational standards require the following three components: 
• Content or curriculum standards that clearly delineate what students should learn in 
each grade. 
• An assessment system that measures student progress toward mastery of the content 
standards. 
• An accountability system that stipulates a set of rewards and/or interventions based on 
student progress.  Such a system should hold not only students but also teachers, 
principals, and entire school systems accountable for the rate of learning of students.   
 How close are the states to implementing educational standards that fit these 
criteria, and how do states vary in that regard? Complicating the analysis is the fact that 
even though standards in practice typically resemble the binary “pass-fail” model 
discussed earlier, these standards have taken many forms.  Some states have implemented 
high school exit exams.  Other states have left the task of assessment to individual 
schools, but have set minimum sets of courses that students must complete before 
graduating from high school.  Some states, also use achievement scores to make decisions 
about whether to promote students from one grade to another, or to assign students to 
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remedial or other courses.   
 Consider first graduation standards.  Throughout the 1990’s states’ graduation 
requirements varied radically.  For instance, in 1993, the number of courses states 
required students to complete before graduating with a standard diploma varied from 13 
in California and Wisconsin to 24 in Florida and Utah.  (U.S. Department of Education, 
1996)  By 1996, California still required only 13 courses to graduate, but Wisconsin had 
increased its graduation requirements from 13 to 21.5.  At the top end, three states – 
Alabama, South Carolina and Texas – had either joined or were about to join Florida and 
Utah in requiring 24 courses for high school graduation.  (U.S. Department of Education, 
1999) 35 
 These variations in course requirements become stronger once one examines the 
specific courses required to graduate across states.  For instance, in 1996, over half of 
states required that high school students take at least two math courses in order to 
graduate.  Another 15 states required 3, and two states (Alabama, South Carolina) 
required four courses.  A number of states’ requirements defy a simple categorization.  
Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts36, Michigan, Minnesota and Nebraska rely mainly on 
local boards to set graduation requirements.  In other states, including perhaps most 
notably California, districts are free to impose their own additional requirements.   
 Several states have more than one class of diploma, in order to recognize 
advanced achievement.  The AFT (1999) reports that currently 20 states offer advanced 
diplomas, up from only 8 in 1996.37  38  Perhaps most famously, New York for over a 
century has offered the Regents’ Examinations and the Regents’ diploma as an advanced 
diploma to supplement ‘local’ diplomas.  The earlier theoretical section of this paper 
 Betts and Costrell  23 
suggests that the creation of multiple credentials can increase the efficiency with which 
schools transmit information on students’ strengths and weaknesses to the labor market, 
provided the credentials are sufficiently differentiated from one another. 
 Notably, in the late 1990’s, New York decided to begin phasing out local 
diplomas in favor of requiring all students to acquire a Regents’ diploma.  This transition 
process has not yet finished. By moving to eliminate the lower tier of high school 
diplomas, the state of New York will in a sense be restricting the flow of information 
between schools and the labor market.  Most other states have been moving in the 
opposite direction, providing additional credentials or recognition to students who surpass 
the minimum achievement levels required for graduation.  New York deserves to be 
closely studied over the next few years. The abolition of local diplomas may make it more 
difficult for employers to evaluate the skills of the middle group of students -- high school 
graduates who currently do not qualify for Regents’ diplomas.  Alternatively (although 
authorities have given no indication of this), New York may yet decide in the future to 
award “certificates of completion” to students who would previously have received a 
local “diploma.”  If so, they will merely be relabelled.  But it will be important to 
ascertain how employers and institutions of higher education respond to such relabelling, 
for that will govern the incentives generated for students.  Clearly policymakers in New 
York are working on the assumption that eliminating the local diploma option will 
generate positive incentive effects for most students to work harder. 
 Educational standards will in practice include far more than stipulations about the 
number of courses required.  For instance, standards must also include descriptions of the 
content that schools expect students to master.  The AFT has published an annual review 
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of each state’s content standards, assessment and accountability systems.  Table 1 shows 
recent trends in the number of states “with clear and specific standards”, “with 
assessments aligned with the standards”, and “with promotion policies based on 
achievement toward the standards”.  For a state to qualify as having clear and specific 
standards, AFT researchers had to determine that the state had clearly worded and 
specific content descriptions in English, math, science, and social studies at the 
elementary, middle school and high school levels.  The second of the AFT’s variables 
measures the quality of states’ assessment systems, while the third measure partially 
describes the state’s student accountability system.  (Unfortunately, the AFT report does 
not include as detailed information on the ways, if any, in which teachers, principals and 
district administrators are accountable for the performance of their students.) 
 The data in Table 1 reveals some fascinating patterns.  By all three measures – 
content standards, assessments, and student accountability - the national trend is clearly 
toward more stringent requirements.  Second, the table indicates large variation across 
states in these three components of educational standards and accountability.   
 Third, and equally important, the AFT study shows a disturbing pattern: all states 
but Iowa, Montana, and North Dakota have implemented or plan to implement tests or 
other assessments that are aligned with their standards, yet only 22 states have 
implemented content standards that the AFT deems clear and specific.  Lack of clarity in 
standards will obviously create difficulties for teachers.  In many cases states have 
purchased off-the-shelf standardized tests that do not necessarily link well to the content 
standards.  
 For example, beginning in spring 1998, California required that all students write 
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the Stanford 9 tests.  In the first year, the test items were not altered to reflect the state’s 
newly developed content standards.  In spring 1999 the state added a battery of questions 
that more closely reflect content standards, but is not yet using results from this add-on to 
the Stanford 9 tests to evaluate schools.   
 As Table 1 shows, in 1996 almost no states based decisions to promote students to 
the next grade on standards, but by 1999 13 states had such policies in place.  This 
number clearly underestimates the extent to which schools base promotion decisions on 
objective assessment measures such as achievement tests.  Many school districts have 
gone beyond existing state promotion policies and implemented their own criteria – and 
interventions, for student promotion.  Particularly well known is the ambitious program 
implemented by the Chicago Public Schools in 1996-97.  Other districts have followed 
suit.  For instance, San Diego Unified School District, one of the ten largest in the 
country, in 2000 implemented its own radical program for assessment, additional 
spending on students lagging behind in reading, and if necessary, summer school and 
grade retention. 
 Promotion policies represent only one of the many ways in which policymakers 
can link standards and assessment to overall accountability.  Another incentive for 
students that a large number of states have adopted is high school exit exams.  According 
to the AFT (1999), 28 states currently have or plan to implement graduation exams that 
are aligned with state’s curriculum standards.   
 It appears that the most difficult aspect of implementing a graduation or exit exam 
is to design the exam so that it links well to curriculum standards.  For instance, 
California published science and social science content standards in 1999, on the heels of 
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adoption of language and math standards the year before.  The state plans to require that 
all students pass a high school exit exam before leaving school, beginning in the year 
2003-2004.  The strong desire among California’s policymakers to implement a school-
leaving exam that is well articulated with content standards has led to delays in the 
program.  Not a single commercial test-preparation firm submitted a bid in response to 
the state’s tender in fall 1999, apparently because of concerns that it was not possible to 
prepare a specifically tailored test for a trial run in spring 2000. 
 A third aspect of accountability is whether states complement the ‘stick’ of grade 
retention with the ‘carrot’ of incentives for students to excel.  The AFT (1999) reports 
that 20 states offer advanced diplomas to recognize exceptional achievement.  Eight 
states also grant preferential college admissions or college financial aid to top-performing 
students.  Others, such as California, are in the process of implementing such policies.  It 
is probably fair to say that a weakness of the carrot-and-stick system of educational 
incentives for students is that the students who vie for the carrots are a different group 
than those who face grade retention.  By the start of high school, some students are likely 
to view college attendance as a somewhat dim prospect.  It remains to be seen what 
positive incentives can be created for such students, especially given the possibility open 
to high school students to drop out of school altogether.  
 A state educational policy that focuses on only one or two of the three pillars of 
educational standards – content, assessment, and accountability – is likely to achieve 
little.  How many states have passed muster, at least according to the AFT, in all three of 
these categories?  Because student accountability can take many forms, we list a state as 
having implemented student accountability if it has or has plans to implement either 
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promotion policies based on content standards, high school exit exams, or differentiated 
graduation diplomas to recognize students achieving beyond the requirements for a basic 
high school diploma.  We categorized a state as having succeeded if the given 
accountability measure was implemented in either elementary, middle or high school.  
(For this reason, the numbers in our state-by-state calculation differ somewhat from the 
aggregate results reported by the AFT and shown in Table 1.)  Based on the above 
analysis, Table 2 presents our calculations of the number of states that fit into each of 
eight possible categories.  The results are revealing: only a handful of states – California, 
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia – have succeeded in all three 
categories so far.39  Moreover, seven states had not implemented any of these three types 
of educational standards to the satisfaction of the AFT researchers.  These states were 
Connecticut, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wyoming. 
 
What Explains Variations in State Standards? 
 Given the considerable variations in standards across states , it becomes important 
to know what causes these variations.  Proponents of national standards may worry that as 
states set their own standards, states in which student performance lags the most will have 
an incentive to do the least to implement educational standards.  After all, not many 
incumbent politicians will want to create an assessment system that might show that most 
of the state’s children are failing to meet expectations.  On the other hand, the existing 
federally mandated National Assessment of Educational Progress data, which beginning 
in the 1990’s began to release results by state, may have induced legislators in states that 
fared poorly to implement content standards, state testing and student accountability.   
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 State population represents a second factor that might influence the extent to 
which states have implemented standards.  Costrell’s (1994) work suggests that smaller 
states will have less incentive to set standards high, because of “free riding”.  Larger 
states are also likely to have progressed further simply because in such states the fixed 
cost of developing content standards, tests and accountability mechanisms can be spread 
over a greater number of taxpayers. 
 The degree of socioeconomic homogeneity, and the overall socioeconomic status 
of the state population, may also influence standards.  States with fewer disadvantaged 
families may set higher standards in the belief that most students will be able to fulfill 
them. On the other hand, those states with greater socioeconomic heterogeneity, and 
lower socioeconomic status more generally, might do more to implement standards, in the 
conviction that such policies can improve the life outcomes for the most disadvantaged 
students. 
 To test these three propositions informally, we first calculated an overall measure 
of the quality of standards based on the three measures listed in Table 2.  Each state (but 
not the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico) was allocated from 0 to 1 point for each of 
the three components of standards listed in that table.  For content standards, we 
calculated the proportion of the four core subject areas that according to the AFT have 
clear and specific content standards in at least one grade-span.  Thus this measure can 
equal 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1.  Second, each state earned either 0 or 1 point depending on 
the AFT judgment on whether it had implemented student assessment sufficiently well-
linked to the content standards.  Third, in order to capture the extent to which states have 
established student accountability, each state earned either 0, 0.5 or 1 point based on 
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whether it had implemented promotion criteria based on the standards and/or exit exams 
aimed at grade 10 standards or a higher level.  These three measures were then added 
together.  A state that had failed by 1999 to satisfy any of the AFT criteria would receive 
a score of 0; a state that had satisfied all the criteria would receive a perfect 3.   
 We then calculated the relation between this overall measure of the quality of state 
standards and measures of student achievement in the mid-1990’s when most states were 
just beginning to implement rigorous standards.  We used three different measures: the 
percentage of public students scoring at the “basic” or higher levels in the 1994 Grade 4 
reading assessment on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the 
analogous percentage in the 1996 Grade 4 math assessment, and the average of these two 
achievement measures.  We also calculated the correlation between our overall measure 
of standards and the natural log of population in the state in July 1995, and three 
measures of socioeconomic status to be discussed below.40 
 The results are best conveyed graphically.  Figure 2 plots the states’ scores on our 
measure of overall quality of standards against the average of the percentage of public 
school students at or above basic levels on the reading and math assessments.  A negative 
relation emerges quite strongly.  States that in the mid-1990’s had weaker student 
performance tend to have implemented more fully articulated systems of content 
standards, assessment and accountability by 1999.  Thus the large variations in state 
standards to some extent reflect greater efforts by states with lagging test scores to use 
standards to reform the existing educational system. This is likely to engender greater 
equality in student outcomes across states. 
 Figure 3 shows a plot of the extent to which each state had implemented standards 
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by 1999 against the natural log of population in 1995.  Here a quite strong positive 
relation is apparent.  As predicted, larger states have gone further in implementing 
content standards, assessment and accountability. 
 Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients for the relationships depicted in Figures 
2-3, and also for more disaggregated relationships.  The table gives the correlations 
between the three components of our overall measure of standards, as well as their 
composite, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the individual measures of student 
achievement in reading and math, the average of these measures of achievement used in 
Figure 2, and the natural log of population.  In all cases, the standards measures are 
related to achievement and population in the same direction as indicated above, although 
the strength of the relation varies.  Obviously, initial student achievement and population 
in the state do not determine all of the variation across states in the standards that they 
have set, but these variables do seem to matter in important ways. 
 Table 3 also shows the correlation between the individual and overall measure of 
standards with three measures of socioeconomic status: the percentage of the population 
that is white (non-Hispanic), the percentage of adults aged 25 and higher who hold at 
least a high school diploma, and the percentage of the population living above the poverty 
line. 41  These measures of socioeconomic status are weakly negatively related to the 
quality of the states’ educational standards.  That is, states with a greater proportion of 
disadvantaged residents have set slightly higher standards on average.  This finding 
should come as good news.  It suggests that decentralized (state-level) standard-setting 
(versus nationally mandated standards) might over time lower inequality in educational 
outcomes across the country.  We also note that the level of standards is more strongly 
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related to initial student achievement than it is to our three measures of socioeconomic 
status.  It seems that low student achievement rather than socioeconomic disadvantage 
has been the more important factor driving the move to higher standards.  
 In summary, we have documented a rise in courses required for graduation in 
many states in the 1990’s, a rapid expansion of state content standards, assessments 
linked to these standards, and student accountability and incentives in the form of exit 
exams and grade promotion and retention policies.  Clearly, a trend toward tougher 
educational standards and accountability is sweeping the country, even though some 
states lag behind.  States in which student performance on the NAEP lagged behind in the 
middle of the 1990’s tend to have done more to implement content standards, testing and 
accountability.  Similarly, larger states and states with relatively disadvantaged 
populations tend to have made more progress.   
 
The Evidence on Effects of Educational Standards 
 How will the new educational standards affect student achievement?  The 
literature that studies what happens to studentoutcomes under different sets of academic 
standards is small but growing.  This section summarizes several unpublished and 
forthcoming papers that use rigorous statistical analysis, reviews a fairly large literature 
on the effects of grade retention, and then examines in some detail the sweeping reforms 
to student testing and accountability in the Chicago schools.   
 
Graduation Requirements 
 Given that all the published theoretical models agree that a rise in educational 
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standards must, other things being equal, cause fewer students to meet the standard, it 
makes sense to begin by examining how many students “lose” from higher standards in 
this way.  Lillard and DeCicca (forthcoming) compare high school dropout rates and 
attrition rates among states in 1980 and 1990, and individual-level data from about the 
same times. 42  Overall, the authors conclude, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
graduation standards, which corresponds to an additional 2.5 courses, is correlated with a 
0.3 to 1.6% rise in the share of high-school students who drop out.  The basic finding that 
past increases in graduation requirements have led graduation rates to be lower than they 
otherwise would be meshes with theoretical predictions, and needs to be taken seriously.  
Policymakers will require much more detailed information on what measures, if any, 
were targeted towards students who were at risk of dropping out as a result of the move to 
more rigorous standards.  Policymakers will also want to know why some students appear 
to have been induced to drop out, as well as what alternative credentials and career paths 
might reasonably be made available to those students (hopefully few) who will drop out 
in any event.   
 The companion paper in this volume by John Bishop, Ferran Mane, Michael 
Bishop and Joan Moriarty provides a more detailed summary of existing work as well as 
extensive new findings on this important issue. 
 
Homework and Grading Standards 
 A number of papers that do not explicitly address the impact of changing 
standards over time nonetheless provide relevant insights.  These papers consider the 
impact of variations in homework and grading standards. 
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 A number of papers have examined the correlation between homework and test 
scores.  Cooper (1989) provides a detailed review of earlier research on the link between 
homework and student achievement. 43  He cites a number of experiments, some but not 
all of which suggest a positive link.  However, the sample sizes in these studies are very 
small (39 to 400 students) and the studies examined only one to eight schools each.  A 
larger literature examines the correlation between achievement and time spent on 
homework in a non-experimental cross-sectional framework.  Cooper reports the results 
of 11 studies that model student achievement as a function of homework while 
controlling for background variables.  Most of the studies indicate a positive link between 
homework and achievement.  But in some cases the research used small samples which 
are not nationally representative.  In other cases researchers used national samples but did 
not control well for prior achievement, thus increasing the risk of omitted variable bias.  
Two notable exceptions are Keith et al. (1986) and Walberg et al. (1986), who use High 
School and Beyond and the National Assessment in Science, respectively, to establish a 
correlation between student test scores and the amount of homework which the student 
reported doing per time period, while controlling well for prior achievement and 
characteristics of the school environment.  44  
 Unfortunately, these studies, like the vast majority of the literature, use a student 
report on hours of homework done per week.  This is not a policy variable which a school 
administrator or teacher can directly control.  In particular, much of the variation in 
homework performed by students in a school might reflect unmeasured differences in 
student ability or attitudes.  Another typical problem in the literature is that achievement 
in a given subject is regressed on homework performed in all subjects.  The ideal measure 
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of homework would be the amount of homework assigned by the student’s teacher in the 
given subject.   
 Betts (1997) attempts to get around these problems by analyzing a nationally 
representative sample of students attending grades 7-12. 45  Because teachers indicate the 
amount of homework they assign per week, it reduces the chance that the analysis merely 
picks up more highly achieving and more highly motivated students choosing to do more 
homework.  The results, for models of math test scores, are very strong, indicating that 
math homework is a more important determinant of gains in achievement than any of the 
standard measures of school quality, such as teacher education and experience or class 
size.  The results are quite robust to the addition of a dummy variable for each student to 
control for omitted ability or motivation among students.   
 The paper by Betts also addresses the questions of “how much homework is too 
much”, and whether only the best students respond to additional homework.  Homework 
assignments ranged from zero to roughly 8 hours per week.  Within this range, no ‘tailing 
off’ of the effectiveness of math homework emerged.  Of course, this study, focused on 
math homework, cannot indicate the optimal amount of homework that schools should 
assign across all subjects.  Second, the paper finds that additional math homework 
appears to be equally effective in increasing the rate of learning across all students, 
regardless of their initial level of achievement.  This is an important finding, given that 
one of the chief criticisms of higher standards and higher expectations has been that some 
students will respond by simply giving up. 
 A separate paper by Betts (1997) examines variations across schools in math and 
science grading standards. 46  It estimates the stringency of grading standards in each 
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school by comparing test scores in these two subjects with grades in math and science 
courses, while controlling for the type of course taken, student demographics, and school 
resources such as class size and teacher preparation.  In the second stage, the analysis 
tests whether students learn more quickly if they attend schools with more stringent 
grading standards.  The answer appears to be a decided yes.  However, in this case, unlike 
the case of homework, a policy of higher grading standards might help all students, but it 
seems to help most those near the top, increasing inequality in the distribution of student 
achievement.  
 
Grade Retention and Summer School 
 The theoretical analysis in the earlier part of the paper focused on a pass-fail 
standard in which there are repercussions for students who do not fulfill the academic 
requirements established by the educational standards.  An increasingly common 
implementation of this idea calls for students to repeat a grade if they lag too far behind 
established standards for the students’ grade level.  Grade retention differs from our 
earlier theoretical analysis in that students receive a “second chance” to meet the 
standard.  Another variant requires students who do poorly on achievement tests to attend 
additional classes after school, on weekends, or in summer school.  Notably, these 
approaches provide additional resources to the students most in need. 
 The impact of grade retention has received considerable attention.  In a review of 
the literature, Holmes (1989) reports that grade retention is typically associated with 
poorer student performance after the student is held back a year.  Only nine of 63 studies 
found that retention improved the students’ performance.  Holmes indicates that in most 
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of these nine studies, the “treatment” of students was not simply retention but retention 
accompanied by quite intensive remediation.  It appears that additional attention to the 
students who lag furthest behind is likely to be necessary in a system that sets strict 
content standards. 
 Summer school for students who have fallen well behind grade level seems to 
offer an alternative, and perhaps less stigmatizing, option.47 48 The Chicago Public 
Schools system has received national attention for a bold program called Summer Bridge.  
As reported by Betts (1998), beginning in the 1996-97 school year, students in Grades 3, 
6, 8 and 9, students whose performance lagged behind national norms on either the 
reading or mathematics portion of the tests were required to attend summer school.  The 
cutoff points below which students were required to attend summer school were 2.8 for 
Grade 3, 5.2 for Grade 6, 6.8 for Grade 8 and 7.9 for Grade 9.  (The tests were given in 
spring, so that a student progressing at the normal rate should have attained a grade 
equivalent of about 3.8 by May of the Grade 3 school year.)  At the end of summer 
school, students were tested again, and were promoted to the next grade if they then met 
the standard.  Betts calculates that in the initial testing, fully 27.1-62.2% of students failed 
at least one of the two tests, depending on the grade level.  Unfortunately, not all students 
who should have attended summer school did so.  But when calculated as a percentage of 
those who actually wrote the summer tests, the success rate at the end of summer ranged 
from 38.4% to 49.6%, with the highest success rate among Grade 8 students.   
 The first-year evidence suggests that the summer school program provided an 
extremely cost-effective way of improving student performance.  The mean increase in 
students’ grade equivalent during summer school varied by grade from about one half to a 
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full year.  These increases hint at large incentive effects on the students and their teachers.  
But important questions remain.  If the Summer Bridge program merely drilled students 
on testing techniques, then much of the gains over the summer should disappear during 
the following school year.  Further, improvement over the summer might in part represent 
“regression to the mean” after some students on the spring test had an “off” day.  A 
longitudinal analysis should be able to provide direct information on some of these issues, 
including whether the creation of high-stakes tests increased student effort. 
 Roderick and others (1999) present the results of a two-year study of Chicago 
students. 49  Among the important findings: 
• Students who attended Summer Bridge in the summer of 1997 retained most of their 
large achievement gains.  However, their rate of improvement during the 1997-98 school 
year was much smaller than for other students, so that part of the achievement gap re-
emerged during the1997-98 school year. 
• To test for the incentive effects, the authors compared scores for students in spring and 
summer 1997, during the first year of the program, with scores of students in spring 1995, 
before the new summer school and grade retention policy was in place.  Gains in Grade 3 
were fairly muted.  However, the percentage of students making the grade cutoffs during 
spring testing increased considerably between 1995 and 1997 in Grades 6 and 8.  The 
largest gains accrued to students who were particularly far behind at the start of the 
school year.   
 This latter finding suggests that the imposition of new standards and 
accountability led to significant increases in student and/or teacher effort, at least in 
Grades 6 and 8.  Table 4 reproduces results for the reading test in Grade 6.  It shows the 
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percentage of students in various categories who met the Grade 6 reading cutoff at stated 
times.  Students were divided into groups based on how many grade equivalents they 
would need to gain during Grade 6 in order to reach the stipulated cutoff.  We show the 
results for students who needed to gain at least some positive fraction of a grade 
equivalent by May of their year in Grade 6 to be promoted to Grade 7.  The first column 
of numbers shows the percentage of students making the cutoff in Spring 1995.  These 
students provide a benchmark case because the Summer Bridge and promotion policy 
were not yet in place.  The second column shows the percentage of students making the 
cutoff in May 1997, the first year of the new policy. The third column combines this 
percentage of students who met the cutoff in May 1997 with those who failed in May but 
met the cutoff during a second test after participating in Summer Bridge. 
 The table shows a marked increase in the percentage of students making the cutoff 
in May 1997 relative to May 1995, with the largest gains among the students who were 
initially furthest behind.  For example, among students who needed to improve their test 
scores by more than 1.5 grade equivalents, only 20% met the cutoff by May of the 
following year in 1995, compared to 31% in 1997.  Because these two groups of students 
had similar initial achievement, the 11% gain suggests that the replacement of “social 
promotion” with strict grade promotion policy in the 1996-97 school year induced very 
strong incentive effects.  Weaker incentive effects are apparent among students whose 
initial grade equivalents were higher, as shown in the table.   
 Table 4 also makes clear that summer school for at-risk students led to major 
gains in achievement.  Roderick and others report that these impressive gains persisted in 
the second year, but Summer Bridge did not lead to greater rates of learning for these 
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children during the subsequent school year, so that part of the achievement gap re-
emerged over time. 
 We cannot be sure whether the apparent incentive effects derive from greater 
effort among students, teachers, or parents of at-risk children, or all three.  In addition, as 
Roderick and others note, the simple comparison they make across two cohorts cannot 
establish whether the new grade promotion policy or some other unobserved change in 
the Chicago schools was the main cause.   
 Still, the results provide indirect evidence in favor of rather strong incentive 
effects related to the raising of standards, as posited in the theoretical review section of 
this paper.  Our theoretical analysis suggested that we need to consider four groups of 
students who are at risk of failing.  In order of increasing achievement, these groups are:  
first, those at the very bottom who exerted no effort with or without the new standard; 
second, slightly more highly achieving students who reduce their effort after the standard 
is raised because they believe that they can’t meet the new cutoff; third, students who do 
not change their effort, and fail under the new system, and fourth, students who work 
harder after the standard is raised.  (At the very top are top-achieving students who can 
easily meet the new cutoff without increasing effort.)  Our main concern is the size of the 
bottom three groups compared to the fourth group which increases its achievement.  The 
Chicago results summarized by Roderick and others yield no trace of the bottom three 
groups of students who either do not change their effort or reduce it.50  Indeed, students 
who had to improve by more than 1.5 grade equivalents showed the strongest 
improvement relative to similarly weak achievers who entered Grade 6 before the 
standard was raised.   
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 Surely, we must exercise caution in inferring the cause of the large achievement 
gains observed in Chicago.  But the finding that higher standards help the lowest-
achieving students the most is potentially of great importance.  It also squares well with 
the finding by Betts (1997) that additional math homework has strong positive effects on 
the achievement of all students, regardless of their initial level of achievement. 
 
The Case of Massachusetts 
Background 
 The 1993 Massachusetts Education Reform Act (MERA) established two prongs 
in a 7-10 year plan.  The first prong, in response to a state court ruling in a district finance 
adequacy case, established a seven-year schedule for a massive rise in state aid in order to 
bring all localities up to a newly formulated foundation budget by 2000. 51  Real state aid 
more than doubled over this period.52  The annual growth rate of state aid in current 
dollars averaged 12.4%, exceeding inflation plus enrollment growth by 7.7%.   
 As a result, all districts were successfully brought up to foundation budget, and 
the gaps in spending were markedly narrowed.  At the same time, even the higher-
spending communities received some increase in state aid, over and above inflation.  Per 
pupil spending in districts at the 10th percentile (i.e. low-spending districts) rose $862 (in 
1999 dollars) from 1993-98, and by $449 at the 90th percentile, due to a combination of 
local and state funding.53  This achievement of raising all districts to foundation budget is 
widely viewed as remarkable, thanks to the surprisingly robust growth of the economy, 
and the bipartisan commitment to education reform.  
The other prong of MERA was standards-based reform.  The law stipulated the 
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development of state curriculum frameworks, to be followed by aligned assessments, 
which would be administered for a few years before triggering consequences.  
Accountability would first apply to school officials, through a school accountability 
program, and finally to students.  MERA stipulated that a Massachusetts diploma would 
become contingent on demonstrating 10th-grade proficiency in the core subjects. 
 Both prongs of MERA were essential to the broad, bipartisan consensus among 
the Democratic Legislature, Republican Governor, and the press and public, in an 
otherwise rather politicized state.  It is important to note that the money came first, while 
the accountability measures were being developed, and the consequences of the standards 
were scheduled to be the last step.  The wisdom of this approach (facilitated by good 
economic times) is that it not only provided the wherewithal to localities, but also 
strengthens the backbone of public officials for phase two:  they are now committed to 
follow through on accountability measures in order to justify the massive increase in 
funding that has taken place over the previous seven years. 
 
The MCAS Exams 
 The curriculum frameworks took longer to develop than originally scheduled, in 
part due to changes in leadership of the Massachusetts Board of Education.  Some of the 
more contentious frameworks, notably history and social science, went through many 
twists and turns before being adopted.54  This delayed the development of some of the 
exams in the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), since they are 
specifically aligned with the state frameworks.  Unlike some states, which have taken off-
the-shelf tests, Massachusetts spent the time and money to develop its own exams.   
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 The first exams were administered in the spring of 1998 to students in grades 4, 8, 
and 10, without high stakes attached to them.  In the fall of 1999, the Massachusetts 
Board of Education voted to go ahead with the scheduled graduation requirement for the 
class of 2003, ten years after the enactment of MERA, but on a temporarily more limited 
basis than was originally envisioned.  Instead of requiring students to pass exams in all 
the core subjects, only math and English Language Arts (ELA) will initially be required.  
The Board also voted to set the initial cutoff for graduation on these exams at the bottom 
of the “Needs Improvement” category, rather than the originally intended cutoff at 
“Proficient,” since the initial 10th grade failure rates exceeded 50%.55  Students will have 
at least four opportunities to retake the tests before the end of 12th grade. 
 Both math and ELA exams  include sizeable open-response and/or essay sections, 
in addition to multiple choice questions.  Specifically, the ELA exams for each of the 
three grades include two sessions for a long composition (one for drafting and one for 
revising, as well as extra time granted upon request),  4 open-response questions and 32 
multiple choice.  The Spring 1999 4th and 10th grade compositions were as follows: 
 
 “Some days are more fun than others.  Describe a day that was great for you and tell 
WHY it was great.  Include details so the reader can enjoy the day as much as you did.” 
 
 “In literature, as in life, things are not always as they appear to be.  Identify a work of 
literature that you have read in or out of class in which this is true.  Select one event, 
scene, or episode from this work of literature and explain in an essay what the situation 
appears to be and what the situation really is.” 
 
The grading standards for passing performance on such essay questions are not overly 
demanding, to judge by the examples of actual student essays released by the Department 
of Education (DOE).56  Essay exams are graded by teachers in a summer program that 
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converts many initial skeptics into true believers, according to the DOE. 
 Each year all of the questions that student scores are based on are publicly 
released, and not used again.  This greatly reduces the problem of artificial test-inflation 
over time as the questions on existing forms become more widely known.57  This raises 
the cost of testing, but at about $15/head, it is still cheaper than AP and SAT exams. 
 
Early Test Results 
 The 1998 and 1999 failure rates were quite high on math in grade 8 (over 40%) 
and grade 10 (over 50%), as well as grade 10 ELA (about 30%).  The failure rates are 
much higher in most of the urban districts (over 75% in Boston and over 80% in 
Springfield).  Moreover, the 10th grade scores did not improve in the 2nd year of the test.  
Two math examples illustrate some of the range in level of performance: 
 
(1998, grade 8)  According to the 1990 census, the population of Massachusetts was 
6,016,425.  Approximately what percent of those people lived in Boston? 
 
Population of Cities in 
Massachusetts 
City Population 
Boston 574,283 
Cambridge 95,802 
Fall River 92,703 
A.  10% 
B.   20% 
C.   30% 
D.   40% 
Only 28% of Massachusetts’ 8th-graders answered correctly, barely more than the 24% 
that would obtain if those who answered the question guessed randomly.58  This was a 
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particularly low-scoring question, but performance on the following question was slightly 
better than most:   
(1999, Grade 10)  Which of the following functions will yield the largest value for x = 
50? 
A.  f(x) = 5 + x 
B.   f(x) = 5x 
C.   f(x) = x2 
D.   f(x) = 5x 
Students were allowed to use calculators during this part of the exam, but still only 52% 
got it right.  Other questions were harder, primarily because they demand students know 
how to apply mathematical concepts, including multi-step problems.   
 Some factors contributing to the high failure rates have been identified in a study 
for Mass Insight Education, which examined records of a sample of urban and non-urban 
students who failed one or both 10th grade exams.59  Approximately one-fourth of these 
students were absent more than five weeks of the school year.  Many of these students, 
clearly disengaged, are likely to become dropouts quite independent of the MCAS.  It 
seems unlikely that MCAS would have negative incentive effects on such students once it 
starts to count, and may well have positive incentive effects for some, once students 
realize they will have to attend school to pass. 
 A number of students left entire sections of the exam blank, including 13-19% of 
the failing urban students in this sample who answered no multiple choice questions at 
all, and 20-23% who left all the open-response questions blank.  It seems reasonable to 
predict that a significant number of these students, and others as well, would behave 
differently, once the test starts to count for graduation.60 
 Other factors that give some reason to believe the failure rates will drop once the 
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exam starts to count include the fact that about 10% of the failing students in math came 
close to passing on the first try, and will likely do so with multiple retake opportunities in 
grades 11 and 12.61  Also, about 20% of the students who failed the math exam are 
special education students, some of whom will be eligible for test-taking accommodations 
and/or alternative examinations starting in 2001.  
 A quarter or more of these failing students were also failing the math or English 
course they were taking at the time.  For the majority who were passing these courses, a 
big part of the problem is the level of the math course.  Well over half of students failing 
the 10th grade math exam were enrolled in remedial/basic math or algebra 1, so they have 
not been taught much of the 10th-grade material expected from them on this exam.  The 
math exam is a much greater hurdle than the ELA exam, and a huge part of the challenge 
will be to get students completing algebra 1 by 9th grade at the latest. 
 In short, there is good reason to believe that the failure rates will be substantially 
lower once the exam starts to count, but they still threaten to be quite high on the math 
portion.  Consequently a full array of remedial measures are currently being implemented 
in a number of districts.  As in other states, these include after-school, summer school, 
and in-school programs, to provide short-term help for students who have fallen behind.62 
 But deeper changes are also called for, reaching farther back in the curriculum, so 
that students will be ready in the normal course of study for the exams they will face.  
This is definitely happening, at an accelerated pace due to MCAS, according to many 
superintendents across the state.  Widely noted changes include greater emphasis on 
writing and on open-ended math problems.  Scores on the 4th grade MCAS exams have 
already shown improvement in the second year of testing.  We now turn to some 
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econometric evidence on ELA-4, which suggests that these improvements were larger 
than the raw data indicate, and appear to reach back into 3rd grade as well. 
 
An Econometric Analysis of ELA-4 and ITBS-3 Scores 
  In the second year of the MCAS, 1999, the mean score on ELA-4 rose 
approximately 4.0 percentiles, and the median score rose 4.5 percentiles over the scores 
of the previous cohort.  As always, the question arises as to how much of this 
improvement was due to a change in the quality of the cohort (a better group of students), 
as opposed to more fundamental change, in the amount of learning in grade 4.  
Fortunately, the Massachusetts DOE has assembled a very useful micro data set that 
allows one to answer this question for the ELA-4.  The state required all school districts 
to administer the 3rd-grade ITBS reading test for the years 1997-99.   The ITBS scores 
are far and away the best predictor of the following year’s MCAS scores.  But the 3rd-
graders in 1998 scored worse on the ITBS than their predecessors in 1997, and then, the 
next year, scored better than their predecessors on the MCAS.   This suggests that the 
MCAS improvement was not the byproduct of a higher quality cohort.  The cohort effect 
worked in the opposite direction, masking an even larger MCAS improvement, 
apparently  reflecting more fundamental change in 4th-grade learning. 
 More rigorous statistical analysis bears this out.  The DOE has linked the 3rd-
grade reading scores with the 4th-grade MCAS ELA scores for over 2/3 of the state’s 
75,000 4th-graders, in order to validate the MCAS exam.  The ITBS score accounts for 
56% of the variance in individual MCAS scores a year later.  We ran regressions with 
additional controls for race and gender, plus indicators for the nearly 1,000 schools in the 
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sample, for MCAS scores of 1998 and also for 1999.  This allows us to decompose the 
mean gain in MCAS scores into that part which is due to changes in the explanatory 
variables (especially ITBS scores), and that part which reflects changes in the effects of 
those variables, the regression coefficients (especially the school effects).  This 
decomposition (known as an Oaxaca decomposition) suggests that the adverse cohort 
effect (from lower ITBS scores) masked an underlying improvement in mean MCAS 
scores of over 5 percentiles (vs. 4 in the raw data). 
 We take the analysis a few steps further, in order to shed some light on whether 
the improvement in MCAS scores represented a superficial test-specific improvement, or 
whether broader skill improvements were set in motion.  We begin with a decomposition 
of changes in the ITBS scores, analogous to that of the MCAS.  Controlling for race, 
gender, special education, LEP, and free lunch status (but without a prior test score to 
control), we find that ITBS scores improved quite dramatically from 1998 to 1999, 
despite an adverse cohort effect.  The underlying improvement in mean ITBS scores was 
over 8 percentiles, after correcting for the cohort effect.63   
 Was it merely a coincidence that 3rd-grade ITBS scores rose dramatically the 
same year that 4th-grade MCAS scores rose by 5 percentiles?  If both events reflect 
improved practices and/or curriculum, stimulated by the introduction of MCAS the year 
before, this would be a finding of great interest.  It is impossible to test this hypothesis 
directly, but we have found some suggestive circumstantial econometric evidence.  
Roughly speaking, schools that added more to 1999 student performance on their 3rd 
grade ITBS scores than would have been predicted based on how much the school added 
in previous years, also tended to add more to their 1999 4th grade students’ MCAS scores 
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than would have been predicted.64  This is consistent with, though it does not prove, the 
hypothesis that those schools which were stimulated most to action by the introduction of 
MCAS were likely to have made improvements in 3rd grade reading instruction as well 
as 4th grade reading and writing.  If so, this would indicate the positive effects of MCAS 
go beyond superficial test coaching to more pervasive improvements.  These 
improvements seem to go back to earlier grades, providing the foundation on which to 
build. 
 
Controversy Over MCAS 
 In the third year of MCAS, controversy has escalated.  Media attention has 
focused on student and teacher boycotts, even though the number of boycotters is rather 
small (about 200-300 students).  Students, of course, are by tradition adverse to exams65, 
so the more important question is why some adults are encouraging them. 
 Objections fall into several categories.  The protestors (and groups such as 
FairTest and the ACLU) claim the test is unfair to disadvantaged students in low-income, 
poorly-funded districts.  But funding gaps have narrowed markedly, and the largest urban 
districts spend above the state average per pupil.  As has been widely noted, the 
opposition is “mostly in the affluent suburbs west of Boston and in pockets of 
progressivism like Cambridge.”66  With a few exceptions (such as the local NAACP), 
representatives of the minority communities have largely targeted their anger at the failure 
of the school system to bring up the skills of their children, rather than at the MCAS, 
since they already knew the general message MCAS was bearing.  
A disproportionate number of the teacher opponents to MCAS come from 
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the history and social studies departments.  They object to the MCAS history 
exam.  It will not yet be required for graduation for 2003, but is being 
administered because MERA includes history in the core competencies.  These 
teachers believe it narrows the scope of what they teach.  One prominent and 
vocal group of opponents is employed by Facing History and Ourselves, a 
company that sells history curriculum to the schools (built around the Holocaust) 
and argues that their curriculum will be squeezed out by MCAS. 
Some of the opposition in the higher-achieving localities is based on the concern 
that the exam is too long and takes too much time from other activities.  The state is 
responding to this concern by spreading out the testing over more grades, such that no 
student in grades 1-7 will spend more than 5 hours/year in MCAS testing, from 2001 on. 
Another objection, common elsewhere as well, is to the idea that a student may be 
denied a diploma on the basis of a single test.  However, MCAS is an extensive set of 
examinations, so that students who write strong essays or excel in open-response 
questions can offset poor performance on multiple choice sections (or vice versa).   It 
seems that the objection is not really so much to a single test, but rather to a set of 
external common assessments vs. a set of local and possibly idiosyncratic criteria. 
 The Massachusetts Teachers Association (state affiliate of the NEA) has also 
joined in opposition to the MCAS.   The MTA recently announced its intention to file 
legislation to eliminate the MCAS graduation requirement.67  Two months later the MTA 
began a $700,000 TV ad campaign explicitly designed to counter the perceived attack on 
public education by those who point to low MCAS scores.68   
What seems to be at issue here is that the MCAS is the key component in the 
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accountability phase of Massachusetts education reform.  The MTA is understandably 
threatened.  Thus far, however, with few exceptions, the Legislature and Administration 
stand firm behind MCAS.  Too much money has been spent over the last seven years 
leading up to this juncture to lightly abandon the insistence on results. 
 Meanwhile, in the school districts that face the highest failure rates, the most 
important story is unfolding: 
Little of this [anti-MCAS] grumbling...is coming from the urban districts 
and poor communities that are the true targets -- and primary beneficiaries 
-- of education reform.  In places filled with the neediest, low-income, 
immigrant and transient student populations, school leaders have, by and 
large, embraced the state’s regimen of standards and accountability.  For 
districts that, prior to 1993, hadn’t been pushed to serve all students well 
or didn’t have the resources to do so, the $5.6 billion spent statewide has 
been a godsend.  From Boston to Springfield, city school chiefs have 
latched on to standards-based reform not only as a quid-pro-quo for the 
new dough, but as their preferred vehicle for improving instruction.69 
 
The ways in which these school chiefs are using MCAS to improve instruction go 
beyond changes in curriculum and remedial programs to more general “leverage” 
(the term commonly used by superintendents) over those teachers and 
administrators who resist changes such as the re-organization of the school day, 
revamped professional development, etc.70   
One of the most striking instances of this leverage arises in the hard 
bargaining stance taken in the spring and summer of 2000 by the Boston School 
Department over the issue of seniority.  As is commonly the case, the union 
contract (of the AFT affiliate) grants senior teachers first refusal of new jobs and 
the right to apply for jobs held by new teachers.  In an unusual development, a 
broad coalition of about 30 parent and community groups, such as the Urban 
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League and the Black Ministerial Alliance, have joined together to side with 
school officials in limiting seniority rules.  As the Boston Globe reports, “Parents 
say the drumbeat of reform – from stiffer curriculum standards to a standardized 
test as a graduation requirement – underscores the importance of this year’s 
negotiation.”71  One cannot help but noting the contrast between the Boston parent 
groups whose response to standards-based reforms is to challenge problematic 
union rules, while efforts to derail the standards are largely confined to the more 
affluent and “progressive” districts, along with state NEA affiliate. 
  
Obstacles to Strengthening Educational Standards 
 Based on our knowledge of reform efforts in California, Massachusetts and other 
states, and the theoretical and empirical research on standards, in this section we outline 
four key obstacles that can stand in the way of higher educational standards.  These 
obstacles are: opposition arising from concerns about the distribution of student 
achievement; problems in defining standards and assessing students’ progress toward 
those standards; the need to align the incentives of all participants in public education; 
and equity concerns created by the large gap in school resources that currently exists 
among students from various socioeconomic groups in some states.  
 
Opposition to Standards Based on Distribution of Student Achievement 
 Opposition to higher educational standards can arise for many reasons, but in our 
judgment the source of opposition that resonates most strongly (if not always most 
convincingly) derives from concerns about equity.  The theoretical section of this paper 
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demonstrates that any change in standards typically leaves some students worse off.  This 
makes the politics of higher standards inherently divisive.  As an earlier section made 
clear, legislators in most states have determined that a movement toward higher 
educational standards is worth the effort.  However, as parents become more fully aware 
of the gap between published standards and the actual performance of their children, 
opposition could swell.  
 Indeed, many parents and legislators might be surprised to learn just how much 
variation there is in student performance at present.  Figure 4 shows the 25th through 75th 
percentiles and the minimum and maximum in student performance on a standardized 
math test by grade level, in the Longitudinal Study of American Youth (LSAY).  The 
LSAY sampled a representative population of American school students between 1987 
and 1992.  Particularly striking is how large the variation in achievement is within grades, 
compared to the average rate of improvement between grades.  Betts uses these data to 
calculate the percentage of students who would be held back a year if the school’s policy 
were to retain students whose test scores were below the national average for students one 
or two grade levels below the student’s current grade. 72  In other words, what percentage 
of Grade 9 students would be held back if their math scores were below the national 
average for students in grade 8 or even grade 7?  The predicted percentage of students 
who would be held back if their achievement lagged by a year ranged from 37-46%, 
depending on grade, in grades 8 to 12.  If instead students were retained only if their 
scores lagged national norms by two years, then 26-40% of students would have been 
retained.  These are very large shares of the student population.  
 Of course, these estimates are an upper bound in the sense that if strict grade 
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promotion policies based on test scores were implemented, it would provide an incentive 
for students to study harder and for schools to reform curriculum and teaching practices.  
The evidence cited earlier from the Chicago Public Schools suggests that the 
development of standards, testing and accountability can indeed spur much greater effort 
among students at risk of failing.  Nonetheless, early experiments with grade promotion 
linked to test scores suggest that these discouraging numbers are not outlandish.73   
 Given the large variations in student achievement at present, what policies might 
reduce the chance that political opposition will overturn recent moves to institute 
standards?  One solution might be to devote additional attention to marginal students 
including those who are most likely to ‘give up’ after standards are raised, in a bid to 
ensure that no student’s achievement falls after standards are raised.  The Summer Bridge 
program in the Chicago Public Schools represents one example of an effort to supplement 
higher standards with programs aimed specifically at the students most in need. 
 However, opposition to standards appears to come not typically from families 
whose students are most likely to fail when the standards are raised, but rather from 
families in areas served by good schools.  (Recall our earlier evidence that in 
Massachusetts and Wisconsin, at least, the most vocal opposition to tighter standards has 
come from rather affluent communities.)  Parents in more successful schools may fear 
that districts will shift resources from their schools to under-performing schools in the 
district.  Clearly, parents’ fear that administrators will reduce funding at top schools is a 
legitimate one, especially in systems with large heterogeneous districts.  The only evident 
solution is to expand total funding so that no school suffers a reduction in programs, 
while at the same time the schools most in need receive additional resources.  Thus, it 
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makes sense to implement higher standards at a time when state budgets make higher 
funding a real possibility.  Massachusetts appears to have followed this policy 
prescription quite closely.   
Some affluent parents might worry that higher standards will make it more 
difficult to “stand out from the crowd” when their children apply to university.  Such 
concerns become potentially relevant when a state imposes a single standard, but the 
existence of other high-end credentials (AP exams, SATs, etc.) renders this concern less 
compelling.  Further, if the existing array of credentials is insufficient to differentiate 
high-end performance, the state can create a range of high-end standards, to create 
incentives for a wider range of students to excel.  If a multi-tiered set of standards induces 
almost all students to work at least as hard as they had without the standards, and if the 
minimum standard is set to ensure that even the weakest students leave school with a 
good set of basic skills, a multi-tiered set of standards makes good sense.  It provides 
incentives for a wider range of students than the group of students near the margin under 
a simple pass-fail standard, while providing top students with a means to signal their high 
effort levels to universities and employers.  Many states have taken this lesson to heart, 
creating differentiated advanced diplomas for students who meet strict standards.   
 
Problems in Defining Content Standards and Assessing Student Achievement 
 Implementation of content standards and assessment of student progress have 
often proven difficult.  The design of content standards has been contentious in many 
states.  Perhaps this is best seen in the history of the movement for national content 
standards in public schools.  In brief, the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 
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(NCTM) developed national math standards during the 1990’s.  These standards have 
provided an influential framework for individual states as they have striven to develop 
their own standards in math.  However, certain elements of these standards have elicited 
objections from parents and many prominent mathematicians.74  Similarly, when 
California first attempted to develop science standards, two rival groups, one led by 
Nobel Prizewinning scientist Glenn Seaborg, and a second led by educators from state 
schools of education, clashed.  In the end, the state urged the two sides to come together, 
with some success. 75  
 Clearly, the care and attention to detail that is required to develop a set of content 
standards suggests that for reasons of cost, it probably makes no sense for individual 
schools or smaller districts to write their own set of standards.  But given the limited 
success of the movement to create nationally adopted standards, the states will continue 
to play a paramount role in standard setting.  
 Similarly, several problems arise in the creation of tests.  First, most commercially 
available tests may be related only weakly to the given state’s curriculum standards.  It 
will take time for all states to develop more suitable test instruments.  For example, 
California adopted the Stanford 9 test for use in spring 1998, and is now moving this off-
the-shelf test toward the new state content standards by adding several components to the 
test.  
 Second, writing tests that provide both in-depth and sufficiently wide coverage of 
a subject creates challenges.76  The solution would appear to be to lengthen existing test 
instruments in order that they provide an in-depth coverage of a wide area within a 
subject.  Essay and open-response questions, of the sort used in the MCAS test in 
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Massachusetts, represent a step in the right direction in that they gauge students’ level of 
mastery of written expression and problem-solving that no pure multiple-choice exam 
could approach.  On the other hand, broadening the test then evokes the complaint that it 
is too long, diverting student time from other learning activities.  The fact that it is often 
the same critics who object to a “single test” being used for high stakes and also object to 
the length of a multi-faceted set of exams indicates the objections are not being quite 
accurately framed; it seems likely that it is the external nature of the assessments that is 
really at issue. 
 A third problem can arise from the natural tendency of teachers to “teach to the 
test”.  This is compounded by the fact that in many cases, the same ‘form’ of the test 
instrument is given several years in a row, so that teachers, and perhaps students, become 
familiar with the specific questions over time.  This can lead to inflation of test scores 
without accompanying gains in true student achievement.  Koretz (1996) summarizes 
earlier work he conducted with co-authors in which a school district had introduced a new 
test form in 1987, only to find a significant drop in the average grade equivalent of 
students on the test. 77  Over the next three years, however, successive cohorts of students 
improved in this test, to the point where students were performing at about the same level 
as students had the year before the switch to the current form.  Two questions arise: did 
the large drop in test scores in 1987, the year that the new form was introduced, represent 
a true drop in achievement?  Second, did the steady improvement over the next three 
years that the same form was used represent true gains in performance of students, or 
merely teaching to the test as teachers became better acquainted with the new questions?  
To test the latter hypothesis, Koretz and co-authors arranged to test students in the district 
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during 1990 using the same test form that had last been used four years earlier, in 1986.  
Their findings suggest that the large drop in achievement in 1987 and the subsequent 
gains reflect the switch to a new test form and subsequent ‘teaching to the test’ on the 
new form.  Little change in true achievement occurred.  
 There seem to be two solutions to this problem.  First, annual changes in the test 
form should reduce gains in test scores that result from teaching to the test.  This may 
raise the cost of testing, but seems worth the price if policymakers and parents want a 
reliable indicator of trends in student achievement.  Second, it seems inevitable that 
teachers will teach to the test, especially if schools and teachers are held accountable for 
student performance.  This tendency can be transformed from a vice into a virtue as good 
tests that accurately and fairly test the students’ knowledge of the given content standards 
are developed.  With the creation of excellent tests, teaching to the test should eventually 
become a good thing.  
 
Creating Incentives for Students, Teachers and Administrators 
 Many states now hold students accountable for performance, through policies of 
grade retention, summer school, and exit exams.  However, most states lag behind 
considerably in creating incentives for teachers and school administrators to work 
towards student success in mastering content standards.   
 California’s Public School Accountability Act of 1999 provides one example of 
the limited incentives that states have put in place to date.  California schools that lag 
furthest behind in the Academic Performance Index, (a non-linear average of student 
achievement), are eligible to participate in the Immediate Intervention/Underperforming 
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Schools Program (II/USP). 78  Initially, schools in this program receive money to speed 
improvement in student achievement.  However, any school that does not meet its growth 
target must hold a public hearing and is subject to intervention by the local district board.  
If, after two years, the school still shows few signs of improvement, then the State 
Superintendent can take over the school.  The principal can be re-assigned.  In addition, 
the State Superintendent can take a number of other actions, including allowing parents to 
send their children to other schools or to create a charter school, reassigning certified 
administrators or teachers, or even closing the school.  It seems clear that the threat that a 
principal could be removed from a school creates incentives for the principal to improve 
student achievement quickly.  .  As the legislation behind these accountability measures 
was passed only in 1999, it will take some time to observe how often and how effectively 
the aforementioned measures come into play in California.  
 The II/USP program and similar programs in other states create incentives for 
teachers and principals, but they seem rather weak compared to the incentives already 
facing students, such as the threat of grade retention.  For instance, outright firing of 
teachers or principals seems unlikely given the collective bargaining agreements that 
typically apply. Similarly, large merit bonuses for teachers, in groups or individually, to 
reflect gains in student achievement, are by no means a widespread phenomenon.  Merit 
pay for teachers has been attempted many times in the past.  But as Murnane and others 
(1991) show, such programs have typically collapsed because of legitimate teacher 
concerns that principals were setting merit pay based on unverifiable information, 
opening up the possibility of cronyism. 79  One reason for hope in this regard is that 
current attempts to improve student assessment might provide mutually agreeable and 
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objective ways of gauging the overall performance of teachers in a school, or the 
performance of individual teachers.  A number of states, and perhaps most notably the 
city of Denver, are beginning to experiment with rewards for teachers based on the rate of 
progress of their students. 80 
 Clearly, much remains to be done to increase the incentives of all participants in 
public education, especially teachers, principals and administrators, to work toward 
fulfillment of content standards by all students. 
 
Gaps in School Spending and Opportunity-to-Learn Standards 
 Inequities in school spending among districts can threaten to derail the movement 
to impose uniform educational standards.  Indeed, during the 1990’s a movement for what 
became known as “opportunity to learn standards” argued forcefully for equalization of 
school spending before implementing student accountability.81   
 The call to partly or fully level the playing field in terms of school spending 
before holding all schools equally accountable makes sense, and is sometimes required to 
meet a state constitutional provision for adequacy or equity.82  But we think it important 
that the public not overestimate the achievement disparities that are attributable to 
existing inequalities in school finance per se.  The reason is simple: existing research 
suggests that school resources such as class size, and to a lesser extent teacher education 
and experience, have fairly limited effects on student achievement. 83  Similarly, the link 
between school resources and longer-term measures of student outcomes, such as 
educational attainment and wages, is modest. 84  
 Consider for example Betts, Rueben and Danenberg (2000), who analyze the 
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distribution of school resources and test scores on a school-by-school basis in California.  
The authors find strong inequalities in teacher preparation among schools (even within 
the same district), with lower socio-economic status (SES) students receiving teachers 
who are considerably less well prepared, whether measured by teacher certification, 
experience or education.  (SES is measured by the percentage of students receiving full or 
partial lunch assistance).  For example, in elementary schools in California, in the lowest 
SES quintile of schools, on average 32.6% of teachers hold no more education than a 
Bachelor’s degree, compared to only 8.8% in the highest SES quintile of schools.  Low-
SES schools also have much lower test scores, raising the question of whether low 
achievement in these schools is caused by a lack of resources, or by the direct effects of 
poverty.     
 Regression analysis suggests that school resources do affect achievement, but the 
effects are rather small.  Figure 5 shows the predicted effects on the percentage of 
students scoring at or above national norms in reading when a school moves from the 25th 
to the 50th and then the 75th percentile in a number of school resources.  All variables in 
the figure except for class size have a statistically significant impact on student 
achievement.  But the figure demonstrates that variations in poverty can account for a far 
higher share of variations in student performance than can variations in school resources, 
in spite of the large variations in teacher resources that currently exist in California.    
 Thus, equalization of resources among all schools might reduce inequalities in 
student outcomes, but only quite modestly.  Looking at the data another way, existing 
inequalities in resources bear only a small part of the “blame” for variations in 
achievement in California.  Is seems plausible that the creation of uniform educational 
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standards could provide the incentive to improve student performance in a way that 
spending hikes alone cannot.  Indeed, the results on the Summer Bridge program in 
Chicago imply that reasonably small interventions such as several weeks of summer 
school can bring impressive and lasting improvements in student performance.  The 
lesson from Chicago seems to be that higher standards, accompanied by judicious new 
expenditures aimed at the truly needy students, can together produce meaningful gains in 
achievement. 
 A similar finding emerges from analysis of the effects of grade retention. Grade 
retention appears to work only when schools try to do something different, possibly with 
additional resources, for students as they attempt to complete a grade for a second time.   
States that reduce historical inequalities in school spending before creating 
content standards reduce the risk of political opposition based on ‘opportunity to 
learn’ lines.  States that implement rigorous standards while targeting programs of 
demonstrated effectiveness to the students most at risk do even better. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 The preceding theoretical and empirical analysis and review of standards in 
practice suggests a number of conclusions and policy implications: 
• Standards and accountability systems do affect incentives of students, parents, and 
schools.  Limited, but growing empirical evidence establishes that significant 
numbers of students rise to greater levels of achievement than when little was 
expected of them and their schools. 
• Assessments should be aligned to standards; they should include open-ended 
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questions and essays worth teaching to; and new forms should be introduced annually 
to avoid artificial inflation of test scores. 
• Localities should retain the option to set higher standards than those set by the state. 
• School financing systems should meet state constitutional requirements for adequacy 
or equity across districts before high-stakes standards take hold (as in Massachusetts). 
• Judicious additional spending targeted at students who are likely to fail to reach 
standards without help makes sense.  For example, programs of demonstrated 
effectiveness, such as Chicago’s mandatory summer school at early grade levels for 
those who fail to meet standards, should be replicated. 
• Incentives should be strengthened for schools, especially school leaders, to ensure that 
students meet standards.  Examples include reconstituting failing schools, reassigning 
teachers and administrators in these schools, providing sanctuary for students from 
these schools in other schools or in new charter schools. 
• Potentially harsh tradeoffs can be minimized by multiple credentials, signaling 
different levels of achievement.  Such signals already exist for high levels of 
achievement.  At the other end, for those students who cannot be remediated to reach 
stipulated levels of cognitive skills, credentials need to be developed to signal 
important non-cognitive skills.   These credentials, such as certificates of completion, 
should be sufficiently differentiated from cognitive credentials to maintain the 
incentive to acquire cognitive skills. 
 Of course, no such list of recommendations can fully anticipate what will work 
and what will not work as we move to full-blown standards-based reform.  Not everyone 
will meet the new standards, just as not everyone met old standards in the past, before 
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social promotion became the norm.  New answers will evolve to the question of what 
shall be done for those who fail to meet the new standards.   In the past, the GED arose to 
meet the needs of those who wished to convey some level of cognitive achievement 
without attending school through grade 12.  For others, alternative settings will be 
developed, such as the 9th-grade remedial schools in Chicago.  Proposals have been made 
in Massachusetts for the community colleges to admit students into special non-degree 
remedial programs, for those who fail the MCAS, but receive a certificate of school 
completion.  After-school programs analogous to the Japanese jukus will also arise, 
whether by public or private initiative.  
 Although the optimal configuration of credentials is not yet precisely known, of 
one thing we can be sure: it would be a disservice to all too many high school graduates 
to continue granting diplomas that provide no guarantee of minimal literacy and 
numeracy skills.   Amid all the rising controversy it is a  remarkable fact that not even the 
most vocal critics of standards-based reform claim that a diploma currently guarantees 
these skills.  The only logical conclusion is that those who would go back to the old 
system believe students should receive a diploma even if they have not been taught basic 
cognitive skills, so that they may continue to be pooled with those who have.  This may 
seem to be a convenient arrangement for those schools that graduate mostly high-
achievers, while waving through their lagging students with a wink and a nod.  But it is 
no longer a credible option for those schools in disadvantaged districts whose graduates 
are known to often lack basic skills, and whose communities have been notably absent 
from the protests against standards-based reform. 
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Table 1 The Number of States with Various Components 
of Standards in Place, by Year  
Year Clear Specific Assessments Aligned  Promotion Policies  
 Standards with Standards Based on Standards 
1995 13 33 Not available 
1996 15 42 3 
1997 17 46 7 
1998 19 47 7 
1999 22 49 13 
    
Notes: Source: American Federation of Teachers, 1999.   
The counts include the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 
 
 
 
Table 2 The Number of States Meeting Three Criteria in at Least 
One of Elementary, Middle and High School Grades, 1999. 
    
Clear Standards  Assessments Aligned   Promotion   
All Core Subjects with Standards in or Exit Number of 
 All Core Subjects Policies States 
yes yes yes 5 
no yes yes 12 
yes no yes 1 
yes  yes no 9 
no no yes 4 
yes no no 3 
no yes no 11 
no no no 7 
    
Notes: Source: Calculated from data in American Federation of Teachers,   
1999. The counts include the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 
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Table 3 Correlation Coefficients between Measures of Quality of State Standards, and   
Measures of Student Achievement and State Population   
 Content   Overall 
 Standards Assessments Accountability Standards 
Math % at Basic, 1996 -0.31 -0.22 -0.49 -0.46 
Reading % at Basic, 1994 -0.32 -0.19 -0.55 -0.47 
Average % at Basic -0.32 -0.19 -0.54 -0.47 
Natural Log Population 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.42 
% Population White Non-
Hispanic, 1997 -0.16 -0.04 -0.49 -0.31 
% with High School Diploma or 
Higher, Aged 25 and Above -0.19 -0.32 -0.22 -0.37 
% of Population above Poverty 
Level -0.20 -0.12 -0.21 -0.25 
Note: See text for definition of variables. Source:  Authors' calculations based on   
AFT data on standards, NAEP test scores, and Bureau of the Census demographic estimates. 
In a small number of cases, only one test score was available, in which case the average % of  
students at or above basic levels was set using the one available test score.  
 
 
 
Table 4 The Percentage of Grade 6 Students Meeting Reading 
Test Score Cutoff in 1995 and 1997 in Chicago Public Schools 
by Number of Grade Equivalents Behind in Previous Year 
    
Initial Number of   After Summer 
of Grade Equivalents   Bridge, 
(G.E.) Behind May 1995 May 1997 August 1997 
> 1.5 20 31 52 
1.5 to 1 36 43 65 
1 to 0.5 50 57 79 
0 to 0.5 65 71 88 
    
Source: Roderick and others, "Ending Social Promotion:  
Results from the First Two Years," page 27.  
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Figure 1:  Incentive Effects of a Rise in Standards,  
Across Productivity Levels 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Quality of State Standards vs. Average % of Grade 4
Students at or Above Basic Level, 1996 Math NAEP
and 1994 Reading NAEP
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of State Standards vs. Natural Log of Total 
State Population, July 1995
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Figure 4 The Distribution of Test Scores by Grade, 1987-1992.  
Source: Julian R. Betts, “The Two-Legged Stool: The Neglected Role of Educational 
Standards in Improving America's Public Schools”. Data: The Longitudinal Study of 
American Youth. 
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Figure 5 Predicted Effect of Changing School Characteristics on the Percentage of 
California Grade 5 Students Scoring at or above National Median in Reading Test, 
Spring 1998 
 
Predicted Percent of Students Above National 
Test-Score Median by School's Resource Level
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Student SES Teacher
Experience
Fully Certified Teacher
Education
Class Size
School Characteristic
Pe
rc
en
t
Low Average High
 
 
Source: Betts, Rueben and Danenberg, Equal Resources, Equal Outcomes? The 
Distribution of School Resources and Student Achievement in California. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                          
1 See Public Agenda polls in recent years. 
 
2 Mass Insight Education poll, November 1999. 
 
3 See Sandra Stotsky (ed.), What’s At Stake in the K-12 Standards Wars:  A Primer for Educational 
Policy-Makers, Peter Lang Publishers, New York, 2000. Authors such as Stephen Arons (Short Road to 
Chaos, University of Massachusetts Press, 1997) have argued that such battles over content are a permanent 
feature of the public (or “common”) school system, and can only be fully resolved by a thorough-going 
system of school choice and vouchers.  However, with or without vouchers, the demand for educational 
accountability in the use of public funds seems likely to rise, particularly in states where the share of 
funding is shifting from the localities toward the state.  The specification of content standards and 
measurable outcomes is central to these accountability efforts. 
 
4 Robert M. Costrell, “A Simple Model of Educational Standards,” American Economic Review 84 (4), 
1994, 956-971;  Julian R. Betts, “The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of 
Earnings,” American Economic Review 88 (1), 1998, 266-275.  These papers, and others cited below, 
provide the formal models underlying the summaries given in the text. 
 
5 A century ago, when a high school diploma was held by a small minority of the population, there was far 
less stigma attached, economically or otherwise, to being a non-graduate.  Similarly, under the traditional 
British system that prevailed until very recently, many students left school at age 16.  Far more students left 
school at this age than occurs in the U.S., and the stigma was presumably much less, since their numbers 
included more capable workers. 
 
6  Indeed, under this model, they should favor standards that are so high that everyone fails, so that the 
lowest achievers are pooled with the very best.  This may seem indistinguishable from the opposite extreme, 
where the standard is set so low that everyone passes, and is similarly pooled together.  However, unless the 
results are perfect, with 100% pass rate, the strategy of a very low standard will surely lead to the least 
egalitarian outcome, by the Rawlsian standard, since the rare failure is most highly stigmatized.  In short, 
the wage of failers rises monotonically with the standard in this simple model.  See Betts (1998). 
 Costrell (“Are High Standards Good or Bad for those who Fail?” University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst, Department of Economics, 1999) relaxes a key technological assumption of this model, that the 
productivity of any individual is independent of other individuals (“perfect substitutability,” to use the 
technical term from economics).   Suppose, instead, workers operate in teams, providing complementary 
services in the production of output, as in the job assignment model of  Costrell and Glenn C. Loury 
(“Distribution of Ability and Earnings in a Job Assignment Model,” University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst, and Boston University, 2000).  Then it can be shown that there is another effect of raising 
standards which works in the opposite direction from the pooling effect discussed above.   High standards 
reduce the number of workers supported by those of lesser skill, which tends to reduce the wage of failers.  
Taken together with the pooling effect, raising standards need not have a monotonic effect on the wage of 
failers.  Costrell (1999) finds that in a benchmark case, the relationship between the wage of failers and the 
standard is U-shaped, and, moreover, the standard which minimizes the failers’ wage actually maximizes 
output.   The paper also analyzes the effect on this relationship of varying technology, cost of acquiring 
skill, and test accuracy.  An important finding, however, is that those cases where a rise in the standard 
reduces the wage of failers are also the cases where equity is most likely advanced by moving away from 
pass-fail systems altogether, toward fuller information.  This is discussed further, below in the text. 
 
7 See Costrell (1994), and other literature cited there. 
 
8 In addition, schools facing the prospect of higher failure rates would also respond with interventions to 
assist “at-risk” students.  We will discuss such interventions later in the paper. 
 Betts and Costrell  72 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
9 It is, of course, an empirical matter of some importance how much less the rise would be, whether it would 
be closer to the full 10-point rise, or closer to zero.  The empirical section will use nationally representative 
data to document how many students are likely to fail under a number of scenarios for grade retention, 
under the naïve assumption that student effort does not respond to the change in standards for grade 
promotion.  We will also present limited evidence from Chicago about how student and school effort 
responds to a rise in standards. 
 
10 See Costrell (“An Economic Analysis of College Admission Standards,” Education Economics 1 
(3),1993, 227-241) for a formal analysis of the effect of standards in the context of college attendance, 
where students are uncertain how difficult college will be until they get there.  A rise in admission standards 
forces applicants to be better prepared and can actually raise the resulting number of graduates, even though 
the number of attendees declines. 
 
11 The analysis here excludes consideration of possible externalities created by peer effects.  If there are 
adverse peer effects generated by some of those who are unwilling or unable to exert extra effort to pass, 
and if the potential benefit for some of staying in school is low, then it may be the case that the optimal 
dropout rate is not zero.  Disruptive students provide an obvious example that is unfortunately not as rare as 
one might hope.  Of course, the best solution in such cases is not necessarily to encourage dropouts, but 
rather to create alternative educational settings  for such students, such as those under creation by many 
systems such as Boston and Chicago, as long advocated by the American Federation of Teachers, among 
others. 
 
12 Evidence consistent with the bifurcation in this part of the distribution is found in the contribution to this 
volume by John Bishop, et. al.  They find that among C/C- students, minimum competency exams raise both 
the number of non-completers and the number of college attendees. 
 
13 Although the general points discussed here and depicted in Figure 1 derive from the theoretical literature 
cited above, Figure 1’s continuous distribution is not strictly consistent with that literature’s simplest 
theoretical models.  Those models generate distributions with discrete segments and a discontinuity in the 
vicinity of the standard.  
  
14 “Lawmakers seek to limit standard tests,” Anjetta McQueen, Associate Press, April 5, 2000, as published 
in the Boston Globe, p. A16. 
 
15 Andreae Downs, “Parents, educators debate MCAS,” Boston Globe, February 13, 2000. 
 
16 It seems more likely that there could be some redistributive effect on learning in the lower grades, where 
heterogeneous grouping prevails. 
 
17 J.E. Jacobsen  found some evidence of this as a result of state “minimum competency” tests in the last 70s 
and early 80s (“Mandatory Testing Requirements and Pupil Achievement,” 1992, mimeo, M.I.T.)  For 
classroom-based evidence that teachers devote more attention to the lowest-achieving students in class, see 
Brown, B. W., and D. H. Saks, “The Microeconomics of the Allocation of Teachers' Time and Student 
Learning,” Economics of Education Review (1987) 6:319-32, and Julian R. Betts and Jamie L. Shkolnik, 
“The Behavioral Effects of Variations in Class Size: The Case of Math Teachers”, Educational Evaluation 
and Policy Analysis, (Summer, 1999) (20:2), pp. 193-213, who show that reductions in class size lead 
teachers to spend more time on review and individual instruction, ostensibly directed toward the lowest-
achieving students. 
  
18 To be sure, this does not prevent some of the critics in these “progressive” communities (both parents and 
educators) from couching their objections in egalitarian terms, as the defenders of those children in less-
advantaged areas whose parents have chosen not to object. 
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19  For a contemporary account of the national standard-setting movement, see Chapters 2 and 5 of Diane 
Ravitch National Standards in American Education: A Citizen's Guide. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995), and for more of a retrospective, see Robert B. Schwartz and Marian A. Robinson, “Goals 
2000 and the Standards Movement,” Brookings Papers on Education Policy 2000, The Brookings 
Institution, 2000. 
 
20 See Costrell (1994), Section IV. 
 
21 John Bishop has provided evidence in a number of papers over the years that is consistent with this 
behavior of employers.  See for instance John Bishop, “Incentives for Learning: Why American High School 
Students Compare So Poorly to Their Counterparts Overseas,” Research in Labor Economics, vol. 11 (1990) 
pp. 17-52. 
 
22 Note that the extent of this problem is inversely related to the strength of local reputation, which in turn 
depends on the size of the entities in question. 
 
23 This assumes that there is no systematic difference between local and central authorities regarding the 
weights attached to winners and losers (i.e. they hold the same “social welfare function”). 
 
24  Indeed, with cross-district heterogeneity, it can be the case that egalitarian societies -- those that assign 
greatest weight to preventing dropouts -- should prefer centralization even more than non-egalitarians.  The 
problem of free-riding under decentralization is more pronounced for egalitarians because they tend to cut 
standards further below the optimal level.  That is, egalitarians may like low standards in their own district, 
but they face particularly high losses from the free-riding of their fellow egalitarians in other districts, 
choosing particularly low standards.  Both egalitarians and non-egalitarians favor centralization if all 
districts are alike, but under cross-district heterogeneity, egalitarians may favor centralization in some cases 
that non-egalitarians do not. 
 
25 Robert M. Costrell, “Can Centralized Educational Standards Raise Welfare?” Journal of Public 
Economics 65, September 1997, 271-293. 
 
26 Different patterns can emerge, depending on the degree of pooling.  But the general point remains: there 
are winners and losers in any system of standard-setting, compared to any alternative. 
 
27 Indeed, we cannot even be sure that a centralized standard-setter would choose a higher standard than any 
of the localities.  If the optimal central standard is tailored to the weakest districts (as it will under some 
circumstances), then the central standard could end up even lower than those weak districts would choose 
on their own.  The reason is that under decentralization, the stronger districts would choose high standards, 
raising the wage of non-college-bound graduates everywhere, including those in the weaker districts, to the 
extent they are pooled together.  This would enhance the incentive for students in the weaker districts to 
graduate, which, in turn, allows those districts to set higher standards than otherwise without deterring too 
many students from graduating.  In this way, it is possible that under cross-district heterogeneity central 
standards could be lower than under decentralization. Even if standards rise for some or all districts under 
centralization, the constraint that all districts face the same standard may still lead to lower social welfare 
than under decentralization. 
 
28 This is in fact the law in Massachusetts:  no district will be able to award a diploma to students who fail 
the MCAS, but districts can impose additional graduation requirements, including a higher MCAS score.  
 
29 Costrell and Loury (2000), applied to the issue of standards by Costrell (1999). 
 
30 For a formal analysis, see Costrell (1994), Section VI. 
 
31 John D. Owen, Why Our Kids Don’t Study:  An Economist’s Perspective, Johns Hopkins University 
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Press, Baltimore, 1995. 
 
32 See James Heckman, “Doing it right:  job training and education,” The Public Interest, (135) Spring 
1999, 86-107. 
 
33 There is a considerable econometric literature on this point, beginning with Stephen V. Cameron and 
James J. Heckman, “The Nonequivalence of High School Equivalents,” Journal of Labor Economics 11 
(1), 1993, 1-47. 
 
34 Economists have documented that they have a generally high rate of “time preference”. 
 
35 U.S. Department of Education. Digest of Education Statistics 1996. (Washington, D.C.: National Center 
for Education Statistics, 1996), and U.S. Department of Education. Digest of Education Statistics 1998. 
(Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, 1999). 
 
36 This will change dramatically, beginning with the class of 2003, as discussed below. 
 
37 The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has published an annual review of the educational standards 
in each state, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.  These publications provide a succinct overview of 
progress, and because the AFT gives each state an opportunity to respond to the annual synopses, the 
synopses gain added credibility.  The following summary will draw heavily from these AFT analyses. 
 
38 Data for 1999 and 1996 are from American Federation of Teachers, Making Standards Matter 1999 and 
Making Standards Matter 1996 (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers, 1996) respectively. 
 
39 Massachusetts meets the criteria for clear standards and aligned assessments, but its exit exams for the 
class of 2003, which were established by law in 1993, were not formally voted upon by the Board of 
Education until the Fall of 1999 (and only for math and English), too late for inclusion in the AFT tables. 
 
40 Our sources for the math, reading and population data are, respectively, Clyde M. Reese and others, 
NAEP 1996 Mathematics Report Card for the Nation and the States: Findings from the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (National Center for Education Statistics, 1997), Jay R. Campbell and 
others,  NAEP 1994 Reading  Report Card for the Nation and the States: Findings from the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress and Trial State Assessment  (National Center for Education Statistics, 
1996), and State Population Estimates: Annual Time Series, July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1999  (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, ST-99-3, 1999). 
 
41 These three variables were obtained from pages 34, 169 and 479 respectively of U.S Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998, 118th Edition (Government Printing Office, 1998). 
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